

3/4/68

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AIRTEL

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - [REDACTED]

To: SAC, Albany

PERSONAL ATTENTION

REC 18

From: Director, FBI (100-443006) - 17

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST-IMATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

Title is changed to substitute Racial Intelligence for Internal Security for Bureau routing purposes.

PERSONAL ATTENTION FOR ALL THE FOLLOWING SACs

- |                  |                   |
|------------------|-------------------|
| 2 - Atlanta      | 2 - Minneapolis   |
| 2 - Baltimore    | 2 - Mobile        |
| 2 - Birmingham   | 2 - Newark        |
| 2 - Boston       | 2 - New Haven     |
| 2 - Buffalo      | 2 - New Orleans   |
| 2 - Charlotte    | 2 - New York      |
| 2 - Chicago      | 2 - Omaha         |
| 2 - Cincinnati   | 2 - Philadelphia  |
| 2 - Cleveland    | 2 - Phoenix       |
| 2 - Denver       | 2 - Pittsburgh    |
| 2 - Detroit      | 2 - Portland      |
| 2 - Houston      | 2 - Richmond      |
| 2 - Indianapolis | 2 - Sacramento    |
| 2 - Jackson      | 2 - San Diego     |
| 2 - Jacksonville | 2 - San Francisco |
| 2 - Kansas City  | 2 - Seattle       |
| 2 - Los Angeles  | 2 - Springfield   |
| 2 - Memphis      | 2 - St. Louis     |
| 2 - Miami        | 2 - Tampa         |
| 2 - Milwaukee    | 2 - WFO           |

MAILED 12  
MAR 5 1968  
COMM-FBI

*Chick*

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TJD:rmm (88)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE.

SEE NOTE PAGE SIX

54 MAR 18 1968

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

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Airtel to SAC, Albany  
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

BACKGROUND

By letter dated 8/25/67 the following offices were advised of the beginning of a Counterintelligence Program against militant Black Nationalist-Hate Groups:

Albany  
Atlanta  
Baltimore  
Boston  
Buffalo  
Charlotte  
Chicago  
Cincinnati  
Cleveland  
Detroit  
Jackson  
Los Angeles

Memphis  
Newark  
New Orleans  
New York  
Philadelphia  
Phoenix  
Pittsburgh  
Richmond  
St. Louis  
San Francisco  
Washington Field

Each of the above offices was to designate a Special Agent to coordinate this program. Replies to this letter indicated an interest in counterintelligence against militant black nationalist groups that foment violence and several offices outlined procedures which had been effective in the past. For example, Washington Field Office had furnished information about a new Nation of Islam (NOI) grade school to appropriate authorities in the District of Columbia who investigated to determine if the school conformed to District regulations for private schools. In the process WFO obtained background information on the parents of each pupil.

The Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), a pro-Chinese communist group, was active in Philadelphia, Pa., in the summer of 1967. The Philadelphia Office alerted local police, who then put RAM leaders under close scrutiny. They were arrested on every possible charge until they could no longer make bail. As a result, RAM leaders spent most of the summer in jail and no violence traceable to RAM took place.

The Counterintelligence Program is now being expanded to include 41 offices. Each of the offices added to this program should designate an Agent familiar with black

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nationalist activity, and interested in counterintelligence, to coordinate this program. This Agent will be responsible for the periodic progress letters being requested, but each Agent working this type of case should participate in the formulation of counterintelligence operations.

#### GOALS

For maximum effectiveness of the Counterintelligence Program, and to prevent wasted effort, long-range goals are being set.

1. Prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups. In unity there is strength; a truism that is no less valid for all its triteness. An effective coalition of black nationalist groups might be the first step toward a real "Mau Mau" in America, the beginning of a true black revolution.

2. Prevent the rise of a "messiah" who could unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement. Malcolm X might have been such a "messiah;" he is the martyr of the movement today. Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammed all aspire to this position. Elijah Muhammed is less of a threat because of his age. King could be a very real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed "obedience" to "white, liberal doctrines" (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism. Carmichael has the necessary charisma to be a real threat in this way.

3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups. This is of primary importance, and is, of course, a goal of our investigative activity; it should also be a goal of the Counterintelligence Program. Through counterintelligence it should be possible to pinpoint potential troublemakers and neutralize them before they exercise their potential for violence.

4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability, by discrediting them to three separate segments of the community. The goal of discrediting black nationalists must be handled tactically in three ways. You must discredit these groups and individuals to, first, the responsible Negro community. Second, they must be discredited to the white community.

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both the responsible community and to "liberals" who have vestiges of sympathy for militant black nationalist simply because they are Negroes. Third, these groups must be discredited in the eyes of Negro radicals, the followers of the movement. This last area requires entirely different tactics from the first two. Publicity about violent tendencies and radical statements merely enhances black nationalists to the last group; it adds "respectability" in a different way.

5. A final goal should be to prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations, especially among youth. Specific tactics to prevent these groups from converting young people must be developed.

Besides these five goals counterintelligence is a valuable part of our regular investigative program as it often produces positive information.

#### TARGETS

Primary targets of the Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, should be the most violent and radical groups and their leaders. We should emphasize those leaders and organizations that are nationwide in scope and are most capable of disrupting this country. These targets should include the radical and violence-prone leaders, members, and followers of the:

Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC),  
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC),  
Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM),  
Nation of Islam (NOI)

Offices handling these cases and those of Stokely Carmichael of SNCC, H. Rap Brown of SNCC, Martin Luther King of SCLC, Maxwell Stanford of RAM, and Elijah Muhammed of NOI, should be alert for counterintelligence suggestions.

#### INSTRUCTIONS

Within 30 days of the date of this letter each office should:

1. Advise the Bureau of the identity of the Special Agent assigned to coordinate this program.

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2. Submit a very succinct summary of the black nationalist movement in the field office territory. Include name, number of members and degree of activity of each black nationalist group. Also state your estimate of each group's propensity for violence. This is for target evaluation only, not for record purposes. Second, list Rabble-Rouser Index subjects who are militant black nationalists and any other militant black nationalist leaders who might be future targets of counterintelligence action because of their propensity for violence. Include a minimum of background information on each person listed; a few descriptive sentences should suffice.

3. List those organizations and individuals you consider of such potential danger as to be considered for current counterintelligence action. Briefly justify each target.

4. Submit any suggestion you have for overall counterintelligence action or the administration of this program. Suggestions for action against any specific target should be submitted by separate letter.

5. Submit, by separate letter, suggestions for counterintelligence action against the targets previously listed as field-wide. These should not be general, such as "publicize Stokely Carmichael's travel to communist countries," but should be specific as to target, what is to be done, what contacts are to be used, and all other information needed for the Bureau to approve a counterintelligence operation.

Thereafter, on a ninety-day-basis, each office is to submit a progress letter summarizing counterintelligence operations proposed during the period, operations effected, and tangible results. Any changes in the overall black nationalist movement should be summarized in this letter. This should include new organizations, new leaders, and any changes in data listed under number two above. Suggestions for counterintelligence operations should not be set out in this progress letter. Use the following captions:

1. Operations Under Consideration, 2. Operations Being Effected, 3. Tangible Results, and 4. Developments of Counterintelligence Interest. These 90-day progress letters are due at the Bureau the first day of March, June, September, and December, excepting March, 1968.

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The effectiveness of counterintelligence depends on the quality and quantity of positive information available regarding the target and on the imagination and initiative of Agents working the program. The response of the field to the Counterintelligence Program against the Communist Party, USA, indicates that a superb job can be done by the field on counterintelligence.

Counterintelligence operations must be approved by the Bureau. Because of the nature of this program each operation must be designed to protect the Bureau's interest so that there is no possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau. Beyond this the Bureau will give every possible consideration to your proposals.

NOTE:

See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan captioned as above dated 2/29/68, prepared by TJD:rmm.