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Congress of the United States
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

MEMORANDUM

Holsinger Transcript to be Returned for
Corrections:

	SENT	RETURNED
J. Holsinger <u>OK</u>	12/6/78 (hand)	12-18-78
I. Spalatin <u>OK</u>	12/6/78	12/7/78
T. Smeeton <u>OK</u>	12/6/78	12/5
M. Finley <u>No corr.</u>	12/6/78	1-2-79
G. Berdes <u>OK</u>	12/6/78 (MASTER COPY)	

Sherry Wilcox 1-29-79

EXECUTIVE SESSION

MASTER COPY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

on

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

INTERVIEW OF GALEN W. "JOE" HOLSINGER

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Washington, D. C.

Monday, December 4, 1978

Official Reporters to Committees

GPO 10-75107-1

EXECUTIVE SESSION

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SW

Congress of the United States Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

December 6, 1978

JOHN J. BRADY, JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF


Mr. Joel Holsinger
137 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Joe:

Attached herewith and hand delivered is the transcript of our interview with you on Monday, December 4. Please note that it is stamped "Confidential" and should be duly handled and protected.

Your cooperation in correcting your remarks within five days would be greatly appreciated. We would also appreciate your added help in submitting as soon as possible the various documents relating to this matter as referred to in the interview.

Cordially,



George R. Berdes
Staff Consultant

12/18/78

Attachment
GRB:rp

*Mr. Berdes:
Approved as per changes
and corrections noted.
Joe Holsinger*

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Interview with Galen W. Holsinger

Monday, December 4, 1978

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and to establish facts in case for subsequent consideration by the
committee.

nger - relationship to Ryan was close and personal

- 3 Ryan's first contact with the People's Temple (PT) through Sam Houston family
- 5 Bob Houston, Sam Houston's son, was member of PT; had wanted to leave the
group; died: police felt it was accidental and the family thought that
it was murder. Granddaughters were taken to Guyana to live in Jonestown.
- 6 Social Security checks were sent to Guyana - apparently Bob or wife had signed
over power of attorney to PT; PT always demanded that they have power of
attorney. Houston wanted granddaughters back because of these Social Security
checks and because of alleged unusual sexual practices of the group.
- 7 Sam Houston/Ryan meeting took place in early '77
- 8 Ryan's practice of pursuing constituent needs
- 9 Started to hear from other families in San Mateo County and subsequently
other districts. PT located in San Francisco. Summer of '77 started keeping
records. Later '77 Ryan contacted State and Justice. Joe Fritas, District
Attorney for San Francisco contacted Ryan about another case.
- 10 Stoen custody story related on this page; reported that Jim Jones' practices
were to have sexual relations with all members of PT making them submissive
to him
- 11 letter to Vance from Ryan - asked that Jones' passport be investigated for
irregularities and any other pertinent investigative work that might help
to return Jones to US. Doug Bennett, Asst. Sec. of State responded saying that
there was nothing that they could do - State showed no interest and declined to
take action.
- 12 Judge ordered Jones to come to Georgetown for Stoen hearing and decision.
Judge withdrew because of threats to his life and the Guyana courts dropped the
case.
- 13 Whenever Ryan was in touch with State on PT or Stoen matter, he would receive
communications from the PT in Guyana or San Francisco.
- 14 Holsinger suggests that there may have been Embassy infiltration but he had
no proof - referred specifically to Richard McCoy. Received petition from
numerous Calif. residents saying they felt it would be best if Congressmen
didn't take a partisan position in custody matters litigated by private
citizens - referred to the Stoen case.
- 16 Ryan had been in contact with Rep. Giaimo on an investigation of cults
in general.

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for master

Interview with Galen W. Holsinger

Monday, December 4, 1978

- 1-2 Purpose of Inquiry - to inquire into various circumstances preceeding Ryan's death and to establish facts in case for subsequent consideration by the full committee.
- 2-3 Holsinger - relationship to Ryan was close and personal
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Human Rights Matter - "Concerned Relatives issued formal complaint (text cited); charges are documented fully.

- 18 200 wards of the State of Calif. transferred to Jonestown some time in this same time frame.
- 18 No official concern by a public group or the State of Calif....only by the concerned Relatives.
- 19 State Dept. relying almost completely on reports from the Embassy in Guyana and from one man in particular there. State was simply rubber-stamping reports from Richard McCoy.
- 20 Ryan built legal record of interviews with members of Concerned Relatives and fugitives from Jonestown - looking for direct violations of law (eg. IRS, Social Security, etc.) Will Holsinger, Joe Holsinger's son, compiled this legal brief.
- 20 Derwinski agreed to go to Guyana, but at the last minute could not go.
- 21 Fall of 1978 Ryan convinced he had to go to Jonestown
- 22 Ryan denied assistance of legal aide from State to accompany him to Jonestown
- 23 Joe Holsinger was at the meeting between Ryan and Sam Houston
- 24 Correspondence Rev. Guy Young to Ryan
- 25 Ryan letter to Guy Young asking about accessibility of Temple in Guyana.
- 26-8 Bob Houston Death - Holsinger said that he couldn't fault authorities (police) there were no compelling reasons for police to say that death was anything other than accidental
- 29 Gordon Linsay - free-lance writer - compiled chronology of events dealing with PT - did investigative work in Guyana.
- 30 Rev. Lester Kinsolving - S. Fran. Examiner religion editor - started articles on PT as early as '71 or '72 but he was harrassed until he stopped (hounded by PT
- 30 Steve Gavin of S. Fran Chronicle was removed as editor supposedly because his thinking was compromised by the PT
- 31 Man named Paul McCloskey - tried to intervene on behalf of constituents in PT matter. Talked to State and got no responses.
- 32 Fall 1978 Ryan decides to go to Guyana personally. Letter to Chairman on October 4 asking permission to go.
- 33 Staff directed to make preparations. Jackie got info in Guyana and Holsinger was to get info on cases
- 34 Press account indicating that Ryan met with Asst. Sec of State Virnon Vaky concerning Jonestown around 15 September. Ryan used Speier as a liaison between himself and the State Department.

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Final meeting with Concerned Relatives and ultimate decision to go October 25, 1978.

- 37 State Background briefings on potential trip (Summer 1978)
- 38 Prior to McCoy's reassignment to D.C. , someone other than McCoy did briefings.
- 39 Between time decided to go and the trip there were 2-3 weeks for State briefings.
- 40 Speier was doing all of the briefings - Ryan wasn't really involved in them
- 40 State tried to discourage Ryan's trip, They were satisfied with their reports and didn't want to make waves.
- 42 Staff had gathered info on the dangers in Guyana but they were ignored by State. State's biggest problem seemed to be with accomodations.
- 44 Contact between Ryan and Mark Lane. Lane may have been tipped off as to what might be encountered by Miss Buford
- 44 Ryan aware of the claims of mass suicide rituals.
- 45 Ryan communication with Ashley Hewitt, Director of the Office of Carribbean Affairs. This communication contained a copy of a telegram to State from the Ambassador in Georgetown reporting a press conference held by Mark Lane, attorney for PT.
- 46 Ryan sent wire to Rev. Jim Jones on Nov. 1, 1978
Ryan sent second wire to Amb. John Burke, American Amb. in Georgetown
- 47 State asked that Ryan work with Jim Jones through Mark Lane, Nov. 4, 1978 request was from Burke.
- 48 Burke's telegram contained the demands of PT - balanced Congressional delegation with Black Caucus representatives; PT was to pick the press personnel; Mark Lane had to be at the meeting when the delegation came to Jonestown. General counsel previously retained by PT was Charles Garry.
- 49 Garry had been bypassed in deference to Lane
- 50 Schollaert returned the call to Lane - Lane wrote a letter to Ryan on Nov. 6, letter was "scathing" and "Threatening" voicing Lane's objections to having his call returned by Schollaert.
- 52 Ryan's opinion on Embassy in Guyana was that people were a bunch of turkeys.
Before his trip he felt that they were stonewalling him
- 53 In Georgetown Ryan got the Concerned Relatives a meeting with the Amb. - Amb. was agitated enough by what Concerned Relatives said that he called Jonestown and started asking questions.

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People in party knew, including Ryan, that there was potential danger.

- 56 Idea of taking arms into Guyana was discounted because it might have been viewed as a hostile action rather than protective action. State had no inclination to help, they claimed that they had no means at their disposal to protect the delegation if something should erupt.
- 56 Holsinger thinks Ryan requested Guyanese troops to accompany him to Jonestown but they couldn't because it was a private affair between 2 American groups.
- 58 Ryan was aware of potential danger to the point of requesting military protection from the Guyanese Government.
- 59 Turned out that PT did have considerable ammunition and thus taking arms into Guyana would have been fruitless. Taking guns would have been provocation and an excuse for trouble
- 60 No threatening phone calls
- 61-2 Did get tremendous volume of mail. Not Leo's idea to have the press accompany him.
- 63 Ryan didn't want publicity but Gordon Lindsay had valuable info - so Ryan agreed to him going. (Originally thought that Lindsay's info was overstated-but it all turned out to be true.)
- 64 Lindsay called to say that Nat'l. Enquirer was not going to run story and he subsequently asked if NBC could go.
- 65 Reiterman, S. Fran. Examiner expressed interest in going.
- 66 Members of interested families were informed where and when Leo was going but they were to make their own arrangements.
- 67 Of 18 interested relatives - three were designated as spokespersons and were to accompany Ryan into Jonestown.
- 67 Holsinger contacted Chronicle to tell them of the trip.
- 68 Leo talked to Chronicle before he left.
- 69 Chronicle decided to send Ron Javers. So now there were 8 press men going Examiner reporter, Tim Reiterman, Examiner photographer, Greg Robinson Chronicle, Ron Javers, 4 NBC-TV crew, and Washington Post reporter Charles Krouse was to meet them on one of their stop over spots.
- 70 Blatant attempt to stop newsmen entry visas by Laurence Mann - Guyanese Amb. to the U.S. who was in D.C.
- 71 Understanding before Leo's departure that Concerned Relatives would pay the tab for the trip.

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thought in Ryan's mind was to have space available on the planes from Jonestown to bring people out - second plane went to Port Kaituma because of the amount of people who wanted out of Jonestown.

- 73 Ryan thought that he would be denied access to Jonestown - media as a protection because with the photographs he could bring them back to Congress and say here is what it is - not what it is perported to be.
- 74 Reports were that PT had compromised people in Guyanese Govt. including Laurence Mann (Mention of his sleeping companion Paula Adams, who was a PT member.) There were reports of \$1 million dollars to the Forbes Burnham Govt. had no verification of these reports which were gathered from defectors.
- 75 Holsinger questioned whether McCoy was on Jones' payroll but there was no real evidence and State had completely exonerated him.
- 76 Ryan Office Record contains names, addresses, and telephone #'s of practically all defectors that survived and gave information to Ryan
- 78 According to Holsinger the original plan for the assault was that Larry Layton was to shoot the plane down in mid-air
- 79 Only means of communication between Jonestown and Georgetown was PT radio.
- 80 A description of things that happened at the airstrip. Had previous information on suicide ritual from defectors who said that Jones had a need to test his followers.
- 81 All information they had on Jonestown was from Defectors-- had little or nothing from State Dept. or Exec. Branch
- 82 State suggested to be careful of Laurence Mann.
- 85 Theory of mutual protection between Ryan and the newsmen.
- 85-7 Scenario as to what happened in Georgetown.
- 87 Amb. call to Jonestown was the first crack in Elaborate structure of PT protection - Jones called for Lane and Garry
- 91 Method of departure from Jonestown of Lane and Garry
- 92 Garry's anger and meeting between Holsinger and Garry.
- 95 Holsinger alleges that Garry and Lane were told that Ryan was to be Killed.
- 96 Holsinger and Lane/Garry story are contradictory. Don Sly was man who threatened to knife Ryan in Jonestown, was also man who took Lane and Garry out of Jonestown - might still be alive -this is all conjecture.
- 99 Holsinger's efforts to get protection for Speier when she returned to U.S. were considered unnecessary by protective agencies in U.S.

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

INTERVIEW OF GALEN W. "JOE" HOLSINGER

- - -

Monday, December 4, 1978

- - -

House of Representatives,

Committee on International
Relations,

Washington, D.C.

4 The staff interview began, pursuant to notice, at 2:25
5 p.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building.

6 Present: Galen W. "Joe" Holsinger, Former Administrative
7 Assistant to Representative Leo J. Ryan; George R. Berdes,
8 Staff Consultant; ~~James T. Schollaert, Staff Consultant~~ Tom
9 Smeeton, Minority Staff Consultant; and Ivo Spalatin, Subcom-
10 mittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs,
11 Subcommittee Staff Director.

- - -

12 Mr. Berdes. My name is George Berdes, staff member of
13 the House International Relations Committee. Also present
14 are staff members of this inquiry into the death of Represen-
15 tative Leo Ryan, and the resulting incident at Jonestown,
16 Guyana -- Ivo Spalatin, the Subcommittee on International
17 Security and Scientific Developments, and Thomas Smeeton of
18 the minority staff.

19 Our purpose, at the direction of Chairman Zablocki, is

EXECUTIVE SESSION

1 to inquire into the various circumstances preceding Represent-
2 tative Ryan's death, to establish as much as possible the facts
3 in that case for subsequent consideration by the full committee.

4 The gentleman present to be questioned is Mr. Joe
5 Holsinger, Administrative Assistant to Representative Ryan.

6 I think we could begin the session, Joe, by asking you
7 to background briefly some of the history of your association
8 with Leo Ryan, how long you have been with him, and any other
9 pertinent facts that come to mind.

10 Mr. Holsinger. Okay.

11 I have been employed as Leo Ryan's Administrative
12 Assistant since January 1, 1975. My practice was that I would
13 spend approximately half of my time in Washington and half
14 in the district office.

15 Because Leo placed great emphasis on constituent service,
16 all of our constituent work was done from the district office.
17 Our legislative work was done in the Washington office.

18 We had a close personal relationship. We had been very
19 close personal friends since 1974. Correction -- make that
20 1964. Since the Pierre Salinger campaign for the Senate.

21 Leo had a home in Washington. I had a home in San Mateo
22 County. We shared each other's homes when we were in
23 Washington or California.

24 I guess -- we have both described one another as our
25 closest personal friends. Prior to my taking on the job of

1 Administrative Assistant, I was a businessman in California
2 in two areas; mostly in the public seating school furniture
3 distribution business, which bears my name. I sold it to my
4 employees in 1971 when I went to Southern California, Orange
5 County, with a company called Dunn Properties Corporation,
6 first as National Market Director and then as president for
7 two years.

8 I returned from there after four years to the Bay area.
9 At that time I joined Jeo's staff.

10 Mr. Berdes. In his district office.

11 Mr. Holsinger. Both offices. I took over as Administra-
12 tive Assistant in charge of both offices.

13 Mr. Berdes. When was the first contact ^{to your knowledge} ~~that you are~~
14 ~~aware of~~ made with Leo Ryan's office regarding the Peoples
15 Temple?

16 Mr. Holsinger. It was early, around March, but early
17 1977, about a year and a half ago. Excuse me -- I thought --
18 there is something missing from here. It must be over at our
19 district office -- I mean, over at our office over here. I
20 will have to find it.

21 * It was a record, it is a very important record, of a
22 letter he received from the Sam Houston family, San Bruno,
23 California, thanking him for stopping by at their home to
24 discuss this family problem, which turned out to be related
25 to the Peoples Temple.

* - See Houston Case Record

1 Leo's practice was instead of holding large public
2 meetings in the district, was to visit to the homes of con-
3 stituents, one family at a time, to discuss their problems.
4 He said he had a better feel of the district that way, rather
5 than the confrontation type of thing.

6 It was very quiet, never publicized. But he did say in
7 his newsletter if anyone wanted to talk to him, he would
8 arrange a meeting in their homes, just one family at a time,
9 20 or 30 minutes.

10 Sam Houston is a wire service photographer who has known
11 Leo for a long time. They were friends for some 25 years or
12 so. As a matter of fact, the history goes back to 1960, at
13 least, when Leo, as a teacher at Capucino High School in
14 San Mateo County, was the faculty adviser to the Capucino
15 High School band, which they brought back for the Kennedy
16 inaugural. They marched in the inaugural.

17 Sam Houston came along as the photographer, I think it
18 was, for UPI or AP. I am not sure which. They roomed together
19 here in the Capitol during that week's visit with the band.
20 That is why Sam's letter, when I get that copy to you, is
21 addressed "Hello Roommate," because of that occasion here.

22 Sam had lost his voice because he had I think cancer of
23 the larynx. So, when we were there he had to write his
24 messages on a little chalk board he had. Sam's wife was also
25 present.

1 Sam now has an electronic device he puts to his throat
2 so he can talk.

3 The story was a rather difficult story. It seems that
4 their son, Bob Houston, had joined the Peoples Temple. Bob
5 had been a student of Leo's. Leo had been his high school
6 teacher at Capucino, so Leo knew Bob personally.

7 Bob had a wife and two children, two daughters. The story,
8 as I recall it, was that Bob had decided to leave the Peoples
9 Temple. He was working two jobs, day and night, and giving
10 all of his earnings to the Temple. As I recall, he had sold
11 the home or mortgaged the family home to give that money to
12 the Peoples Temple.

13 According to the family, he was going to leave the Temple.
14 As a matter of fact, it was there -- as I recall it, he had
15 told them he was going to leave the Peoples Temple. He
16 decided he was not going to be a member anymore.

17 One of his jobs was down at the railroad yards at night,
18 around Third and Townsend, in San Francisco ^{or in Oakland.} I am not quite
19 sure whether it was outside work. He was found dead the next
20 morning of a blow on the head.

21 The police ruled it accidental death, as if he had fallen.
22 The family was sure he had been murdered.

23 Their concern was that their two granddaughters had been
24 taken to Guyana, to Jonestown. The mother, I believe, had
25 gone to Jonestown originally, or perhaps had accompanied them,

1 I am not sure of that.

2 Mr. Berdes. That is Bob Houston's wife?

3 Mr. Holsinger. Yes. The letter will explain this in
4 detail. I have the letter. I just -- somehow the copy is
5 misplaced. Maybe somebody is making a copy of it in the
6 office. I don't know. That will make it very clear, the
7 circumstances.

8 But their concern was for their two granddaughters who
9 were alone in Jonestown, without any relatives there at all.
10 They related that the Social Security checks after Bob's death
11 were being sent to Guyana, that apparently Bob or his wife
12 or both had signed the usual powers of attorney that the
13 Peoples Temple always demanded from everybody.

14 They got these in advance, giving them almost complete
15 charge over peoples' lives. Anything they did, they could
16 always say, "We have the power of attorney." So, the Houston
17 family were trying to get these two granddaughters returned
18 there for two reasons. Well, several reasons.

19 Of course, they wanted them back. But they thought they
20 were being held there for two reasons. One was the money,
21 the Social Security checks, which they obviously were being
22 used by the Peoples Temple, and by Jim Jones. The second was
23 that they had heard of the unusual sexual practices that were
24 being practiced by Jones and others and they felt their two
25 young granddaughters were subject to being misused in that

1 fashion. They were afraid of that.

2 Mr. Berdes. How old were those girls? ~~Do you have any~~
3 ~~idea?~~

4 Mr. Holsinger. Well, they are in their -- as I recall,
5 they are in their early teens. I take it at the present they
6 would have been, if they had survived, I think this year 14
7 and 15. At that time they would have been two years minus that
8 about two years minus that. Call that 12 and 14, something
9 like that.

10 So, it was a very emotional meeting. They had a lot of
11 clippings, a lot of evidence, a lot of clippings on the Peoples
12 Temple. They related in great detail the problems of the
13 Peoples Temple to Leo.

14 It was a rather emotional meeting -- Sammy is a little
15 guy, and Leo is a big man -- they embraced each other. Sammy
16 was crying. Leo patted him on the shoulder and said, "Sammy,
17 I tell you whatever I can do to get your granddaughters back
18 and make sure they are safe I will do, no matter what the
19 cost."

20 Mr. Berdes. When did that meeting take place?

21 Mr. Holsinger. In early 1977. I looked for the date
22 on the letter. The way the letter had been photocopied, it
23 didn't show a date.

24 We can check that from our records. We always kept a
25 record of his appointments.

1 Mr. Berdes. That ~~is~~^{was} what Leo Ryan's first contact of
2 any kind with the Peoples Temple?

3 Mr. Holsinger. That is correct.

4 Mr. Berdes. Early 1977?

5 Mr. Holsinger. Yes. And Leo, as you may have heard,
6 put constituent service above all else in his work in the
7 House, serving the individual needs of his constituents and
8 the group need.

9 That was number one priority with Leo. He had a habit
10 or a practice of pursuing those constituent needs, determining
11 whether or not they were legitimate. If he took it as far as
12 he could, and if he found out that the concern was answered to
13 his satisfaction, and was proper, he would write to the
14 people or meet with them and say, "This is all I can do. I
15 consider this to be the case. In this case the agency is
16 correct or not." But he always followed through until a
17 decision was made.

18 Mr. Berdes. Okay.

19 What other contacts from interested constituents ~~have~~^{were}
20 ~~been~~ made to Leo and when regarding the Peoples Temple?

21 Mr. Holsinger. I have some of the records here with me.
22 As it turned out, this kind of opened the box because the
23 Houston's knew other families who were distressed.

24 Leo said, "Let me know any other families who have the
25 same problem." So, we started hearing from other families
with similar problems. At first it was just within his

1 district, in San Mateo County. But then, because Leo appeared
2 to be one of the few Members of Congress who was interested
3 in the matter, and pursuing it, more and more people came call-
4 ing on us asking for our help, even outside the district.

5 The Peoples Temple was located in San Francisco, which
6 adjoins San Mateo County. The proportions of this whole thing
7 slowly unfolded. We just learned as we went along, but along
8 about last summer, Leo said, "Let's start keeping a record on
9 this."

10 Mr. Berdes. The summer of 1978?

11 Mr. Holsinger. The summer of 1977.

12 Mr. Berdes. Excuse me. All right.

13 Mr. Holsinger. And perhaps toward the fall. We started
14 making contacts with the State Department and with other
15 agencies.

16 Mr. Berdes. Within a period of approximately three to
17 four months the thing had mushroomed.

18 Mr. Holsinger. Mushroomed, okay. It mushroomed to the
19 point that by the latter part of 1977 Leo communicated with
20 both the State Department and the Justice Department on the
21 matter.

22 * We found that the courts were involved. The District
23 Attorney of San Francisco, Joe Freitas, in late November
24 contacted Leo and wrote him a letter enclosing a copy of a
25 court order obtained in Superior Court in California ordering

* See Stoen Case Record

1 the return of the custody of Jack Victor Stoen to Grace Stoen,
2 the mother. This was the son that James Jones claimed he had
3 sired, although the Stoens' contention was that Jones was
4 sterile and that part of his psychological problem was that he
5 felt that this boy, because Tim Stoen and Jones looked some-
6 what alike, this must be his son because he had intercourse
7 with Grace Stoen.

8 Jones' practice, from our reports, was that he had to
9 make everybody submissive to him by having sexual relations
10 with young and old, men and women, and that somehow bound them
11 to him.

12 So, this became a great controversy. But the court here
13 had ruled in favor of Grace Stoen. They then went through
14 the courts of Guyana. The Stoens went to Guyana to present the
15 matter to the Guyana courts. The Guyana court apparently was
16 going to decide in favor of the Stoens. They had come
17 through --

18 Mr. Spalatin. Why did Freitas advise Ryan of this
19 development? Because he knew of Ryan's interest?

20 Mr. Holsinger. Yes. He knew of Ryan's interest and he
21 couldn't get any help anywhere else.

22 Mr. Spalatin. Okay.

23 Mr. Holsinger. Apparently he had not received the same
24 reception from the Members of Congress from San Francisco.

25 Mr. Spalatin. I see.

1 Mr. Holsinger. He knew that Leo was investigating this.
2 It was only natural he would get to the Congressman he knew,
3 who was on the International Relations Committee, and it was
4 a natural thing -- Leo was a senior member of the International
5 Relations Committee from California.

6 I think it was not a putdown of anybody else. It was
7 simply a matter of knowing Leo personally and knowing he was
8 on the IR committee and dealing through Leo. It seemed
9 proper.

10 * Leo wrote a letter to the Secretary of State, Cyrus
11 Vance, on December 3, 1977, and in his letter asked -- a copy
12 of the letter will be here for you -- asking that in effect,
13 that Jones' passport be investigated for any irregularities,
14 and that any other means be investigated that could be done
15 to return Jones to this country, to face this court order,
16 to answer this court order.

17 Jones had apparently fled to Jonestown and set up the Temple
18 there because he was afraid this court order would force him
19 to relinquish custody of his son, the boy he claimed was his.

20 * We had a response from an Assistant Secretary of State
21 in charge of congressional affairs. Doug Bennett was the one
22 who responded for the Secretary.

23 In effect he said there was nothing they could. It would
24 have to go to the courts in Guyana. They declined to take
25 any action whatsoever, showed no interest in it. The letter

See Stoen Case Record
" " " "

1 is self-explanatory.

2 They proceeded in the courts in Guyana. The judge was
3 apparently ready to render a decision. Every indication was
4 to the Stoens it was going to be favorable to them and against
5 Jones.

6 Jones was ordered by the judge to bring the boy into
7 Georgetown for the hearing and for the decision, which Jones
8 refused to do. Instead, the judge withdrew from the case,
9 stating publicly that both he and his wife had received
10 anonymous phone calls threatening them with death if he did
11 not drop the case, if he did not withdraw from the case.

12 He withdrew from the case and the Guyana courts dropped
13 the matter and it was never heard again. They simply refused to
14 reassign it and dropped it.

15 Mr. Berdes. Some of the things that I have read on that
16 very subject, however, suggested that there had been some
17 form of communication between Jones in Guyana with his
18 people in California threatening some form of mass suicide
19 if it were pursued, that as a result in part the Stoens them-
20 selves apparently had requested that the matter be rescinded.

21 Mr. Holsinger. That is not correct.

22 Mr. Berdes. That is not correct?

23 Mr. Holsinger. The judge withdrew because of the threats
24 to his life. They did not rescind it.

25 Mr. Spalatin. The Guyanese judge.

1 Mr. Holsinger. Yes. An interesting thing to note here
2 is it seemed to us as a pattern, I think the file will bear
3 me out, whenever Leo was in touch with the State Department
4 on anything relating to the Peoples Temple or the Stoen matter
5 or any other matter we would start getting letters immediately
6 from the Peoples Temple personnel either in Guyana or in San
7 Francisco.

8 Now, if you are in touch with the State Department and
9 you realize that information is being passed along to people
10 being investigated almost immediately, you begin to wonder
11 just how the information from the State Department reaches
12 the Peoples Temple so quickly.

13 Mr. Spalatin. Are you implying by that that there was
14 some leak?

15 Mr. Holsinger. I am stating that there had to be some form
16 of direct communication by somebody in the employee of the
17 State Department, probably in Georgetown, who felt it part of
18 his job or her job to communicate the concerns being passed
19 along from the United States directly to the Peoples Temple.

20 Mr. Spalatin. You are saying that there is a possibility
21 that our Embassy in Georgetown may have been infiltrated?

22 Mr. Holsinger. No, I am not sure that is true at all. I
23 think that from the glimpse I had personally of at least one
24 member of the consular service there, I would say that he
25 might be -- it might even be sheer inadequacy or stupidity, the

1 way he saw his job.

2 I have no proof that there was anything other than that.
3 But I wouldn't be surprised that he was just an inadequate
4 person. I am referring specifically to Richard McCoy.

5 Mr. Spalatin. Perhaps we can return to that question. I
6 think we are establishing a preliminary record here. We would
7 like to proceed with this ~~unfurling~~ ^{unfolding} of the chronology as best ^{as}
8 we can to establish at what point Leo decided to go to Guyana.

9 Mr. Holsinger. Okay. I would like to answer one more of
10 your questions before we go into that.

11 You asked about letters coming to Leo. At the time of
12 Leo's involvement with the Stoen case -- I have here a petition
13 signed by a great number of people, from all over California,
14 and the petition states in various forms that we, the under-
15 signed, are of the firm opinion that it would be inappropriate
16 and inadvisable for Members of Congress of the United States
17 to take a partisan position in the custody matter currently
18 being litigated by private citizens of the United States in
19 the courts of Guyana involving Mr. and Mrs. Timothy Stoen and
20 Reverend Jim Jones.

21 "Reverend Jones heads the Peoples Temple agricultural
22 mission located in the northwest region of Guyana. The project
23 is considered a model community by the Guyanese. It has great
24 credit to the image of Americans abroad.

25 "For U.S. Congressmen to take sides in a private custody

1 issue would only serve to impair the good relations between
2 these two nations."

3 Mr. Spalatin. When were those received, approximately?

4 Mr. Holsinger. They are not dated, so I can't be sure,
5 it is approximately around the time that Leo got a letter from
6 a representative of the Peoples Temple telling him he was
7 sure that Leo's name was being used in vain in this matter,
8 and so Leo responded.

9 I have the date of Leo's response to that letter here.
10 It is my recollection it was in the summer of 1977. I would
11 like to ask at this time that I be allowed to make a phone
12 call, because some of the records that are apparently removed
13 from this file are crucial to what I am telling you. I really
14 need to have those.

15 (Off the record)

16 Mr. Smeeton. ^{Should} It ~~might~~ be appropriate ^{and} to note some of
17 the documents cited, the letter to Vance, the earlier document
18 from Mr. Houston to ^{Congressman Ryan?} Leo, ^{to} be incorporated into the record.

19 Mr. Holsinger. Everything I give you today will be yours
20 to choose for the record.

21 (Brief recess)

22 Mr. Berdes. Back on the record, please.

23 Mr. Spalatin. You were referring to the petition received.

24 Mr. Holsinger. I have that. I am referring to some
25 things here, the letter from Sam Houston, and a few other

* See Case Record C (People's Temple
Petitions to L.J. Ryan)

1 things that were early on which you are asking about.

2 ~~Mr. Spalatin. Is the relationship--~~

3 Mr. Berdes. What you have laid out so far, Joe, suggests
4 that there was a building momentum of interest on Leo's part
5 that led him to make this overture to the Secretary of State
6 in December of 1977 on behalf of the Stoens, which apparently
7 was at least in part rebuffed, allegedly because of the State
8 Department's inability to do anything, that the issue then
9 continued to grow in Leo's mind.

10 Mr. Holsinger. Yes.

11 Mr. Berdes. And led him at some point to decide to go
12 to Guyana himself. Can you tell us when that happened or when
13 the thought emerged?

14 Mr. Holsinger. All right. I would say also he had also
15 been in touch with the Justice Department, along with Repre-
16 sentative Giaimo, about investigation of cults in general.
17 His interest grew not just for the Peoples Temple but with the
18 growing danger of cults calling themselves churches, acting
19 not as churches but either as political action groups or as
20 fund-raising groups, tax free.

21 I would say the momentum grew increasingly until
22 approximately the summer of 1978. The pressure kept building
23 and building. As we found more and more, more and more people
24 kept coming to Leo, both here and in the district. We began
25 to see a pattern that was quite frightening.

1 One of the key issues was something called the human
2 rights matter, which was widely communicated. I have it here.

3 In April of 1978 a group called the Concerned Relatives
4 issued April 17 of 1978 a formal complaint, "An accusation of
5 human rights violations committed by Reverend James Warren
6 Jones against our children and relatives, Peoples Temple jungle
7 encampment in Guyana, South America."

8 ✱ It was a "To Whom It May Concern" release, quite documented,
9 with affidavits signed and notarized on specific complaints.

10 I have attached here a copy of a newspaper article on that,
11 April 12, concerning these charges, that they had gone to the
12 press to try to get some action.

13 The charges themselves you can read for yourself and
14 judge for yourself.

15 Mr. Berdes. That article and those documents will be a
16 part of the record.

17 Mr. Holsinger. Were part of the record. They had a great
18 deal to do with Leo's increasing interest in what was happening
19 because they appealed not only to the United States, but this
20 document cites the violations under not only of our
21 Constitution, they quote the particular articles of the
22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the U.N.
23 General Assembly in 1948, and the Constitution of the Cooper-
24 ative Republic of Guyana, all being violated according to these
25 sworn statements.

See Case Record F (Human Rights Charges)

1 Mr. Smeeton. Could I interject here just for a second.
 2 As I recall, ~~I think Jackie might have mentioned to me~~
 3 Jackie Speier indicated to me ~~I think~~ back in October that
 4 there were somewhere in the neighborhood of 200 wards of the
 5 State of California, children, who were transferred to
 6 Jonestown sometime during ~~this~~ ^{the} time frame we are discussing
 7 now.

8 Do you have any information on that or did you get any
 9 information that would be pertinent to insert ^{in the record} ~~at this time~~ or
 10 discuss at this time?

11 ² Mr. Holsinger. I have a copy -- I wasn't sure what it was.
 12 It was a list put out by the Peoples Temple itself purporting
 13 to show how much money they were saving this country by having
 14 those people down there rather than here, being paid up here.
 15 I am not sure what it was.

16 That is one of the things I did not bring over. *

17 Mr. Smeeton. Do you have any indication of the State of
 18 California and ~~the~~ ^{these} people within the state ~~who would be~~
 19 charged with the responsibility of overseeing how these ~~kids~~ ^{children}
 20 were cared for making inquiries ~~in Jonestown~~ ^{Congressman Ryan} or asking Leo
 21 to look into their care when he ~~went down there later on?~~ ^{visited Jonestown?}

22 Mr. Holsinger. There was no indication, to my knowledge,
 23 of any official concern by any public group, including the
 24 State of California. It was only the concerned relatives
 25 and the fugitives from the Peoples Temple who were giving us

1 this information and asking for assistance.

2 Mr. Berdes. By the summer of 1978 the thought was pretty
3 firm in Leo's mind that something had to be done about this,
4 and that he apparently was going to do it personally.

5 Is that a fair statement?

6 Mr. Holsinger. I don't think that that really jelled in
7 his mind at that time. I may be wrong. He kept trying to go
8 through official channels, through the State Department. I
9 know that he requested the State Department to send down --
10 he told me he had -- asked the State Department to send down a
11 special investigative group from Washington because he was
12 not satisfied with the reports that they were getting from
13 the Embassy, from the consular officials.

14 I personally checked with some friends of mine who
15 happened to be knowledgeable about affairs in the State
16 Department, and their report back to me was that the State
17 Department was relying almost completely on the reports from
18 the Embassy and from one man in particular that they were just
19 simply rubberstamping the reports put out by Richard McCoy.

20 Mr. Berdes. Okay. When did Leo reach the decision to
21 go to Jonestown?

22 Mr. Holsinger. It was in the fall of this year, fall of
23 1978. I am familiar with this because he hired my son to do
24 some part-time investigative work for him. My son, William
25 Holsinger, had worked here in Leo's office in 1973-74, for

1 one year, after his graduation from college, as an intern,
2 staff assistant, for one year, after which time he returned
3 to California and prepared to go into law school.

4 My son graduated from law school in May of this year,
5 from Hastings College of Law in San Francisco. He took his
6 bar exam in late July. Leo wanted to build a legal record of
7 all of the interviews with the members of the Concerned
8 Relatives and the fugitives. He was also looking for direct
9 violations of the law, whether Internal Revenue, Social
10 Security, whatever.

11 He wanted somebody trained in legal matters to conduct
12 those investigations because he said at that time, "It looks
13 like the only way we can get any answers on this thing is to
14 have me go myself, because no one else will do it."

15 He did not want to go. It was 5,000 miles away, in the
16 middle of the jungle. He made every effort he possibly could to
17 get anyone else to do it instead. He sent a letter to every
18 member of the California delegation asking them to accompany
19 him on the trip.

20 He asked other members of the International Relations
21 Committee to go down. He finally got one. Representative
22 Derwinski agreed to go. But at the last minute, for some
23 reason, Derwinski was not able to go.

24 Mr. Berdes. Can we discuss this legal brief that your son
25 was asked to pull together? Did that develop?

1 Mr. Holsinger. Yes.

2 Mr. Berdes. Have you got copies of it?

3 Mr. Holsinger. I have copies of only some of the inter-
4 views. I have tapes of others. It turned out that the quality
5 of the recorder that he used, that Leo sent him from Washington
6 was not good. My son's voice comes through very clearly in
7 the transcription. The tapes, the recordings of the interviews
8 with these people were difficult to transcribe.

9 ~~*~~ I have a couple of them here. I also have over at our
10 office the tapes themselves, which with better electronic
11 equipment you may be able to transcribe yourself through your
12 facilities here. Those are available to you.

13 Mr. Berdes. The point, however, is that by the fall of
14 1978 these various efforts that Leo had exercised convinced
15 him that he personally was going to go to Guyana?

16 Mr. Holsinger. Yes. Every other approach had been thwarted.
17 He had a decision then whether he, too, was going to drop the
18 matter, as others had done, or whether he had to go himself
19 because no one else -- everyone else had been blocked.

20 This was a situation deep in the jungle, 5,000 miles away,
21 protected. I don't think anyone ever believed that one man,
22 even a Member of Congress, could ever penetrate the defenses
23 in depth that had been built, not only down there, but in
24 this country, with public opinion and with public officials
25 in this country.

~~*~~ See Case Record G (Guyana Research)
Sections C-1 - C-5

1 Mr. Berdes. So it was at that point that he made his
2 request of the chairman of this committee and to the State
3 Department to go to Guyana?

4 Mr. Holsinger. That is correct.

5 Mr. Berdes. And he requested various meetings and briefings
6 in preparation for that effort, is that correct?

7 Mr. Holsinger. He did. He also requested the State
8 Department send along a legal aide from their staff to accompany
9 him on the trip so that he would be sure not to violate any
10 international or any protocol between the countries.

11 He wanted that assistance. He was denied that assistance
12 in a letter that states--which I do not have here, but I am
13 getting--that they were too busy to send a legal assistant
14 along, a legal aide along from the State Department, which he
15 felt showed to him further indifference or perhaps blockage
16 by the State Department, who simply appeared not to want to
17 ruffle the waters and felt their official policy appeared to be
18 those 1,500 Americans or 1,000 Americans down there were no
19 concern of the state Department or of the Government of the
20 United States.*

21 Mr. Berdes. Okay. That, I think, brings us to a point
22 where the next major issue, the adequacy of the State Depart-
23 ment's efforts have been called into question. I think we
24 will turn the questioning over at this stage to Ivo Spalatin
25 and Tom Smeeton.

* - See Case Record H - State Dept.

1 Mr. Spalatin. After the meeting with Sam Houston, expos-
2 ing Leo for the first time to the matter, and ^{after} ~~presumably~~ Leo
3 came back to his office here in Washington, did he meet with
4 you and then presumably share with you the results of that
5 meeting? Did that result in a direction to you to --

6 Mr. Holsinger. I was at the meeting with him.

7 Mr. Spalatin. I am sorry. I didn't realize that.

8 Mr. Holsinger. I accompanied him to that meeting with Sam
9 Houston.

10 Mr. Spalatin. Pursuant to that, what were some of the
11 first steps that you took on behalf of Leo in reference to
12 that? Did you contact the State Department pursuant to that,
13 or did you start collecting data?

14 Mr. Holsinger. We started collecting data. We started
15 collecting data not only on the Houston case, but that led
16 us into obviously the Peoples Temple itself, what kind of a
17 group it was.

18 Even though Leo knew Sam personally he was very careful
19 to verify anything investigated because there were always
20 errors of judgment or opinions. So we started building a case,
21 a Sam Houston file, that was a constituent file, case matter.

22 That inevitably led us into more concerns with the
23 Peoples Temple, more cases coming in.

24 (Off the record)

25 Mr. Spalatin. Back on the record.

1 When was the first ^{communication} ~~correspondence~~ -- telephone or
2 formal correspondence -- you had with the State Department
3 on this issue? You referred earlier to the December 3, 1977
4 letter to Secretary Vance. Was there any communications prior
5 to December 3, 1977?

6 Mr. Holsinger. I will check that for the record.

7 Mr. Spalatin. Coupled with that, Joe, you made the obser-
8 vation, you said that whenever --

9 Mr. Holsinger. December 8, 1977.

10 Mr. Spalatin. December 8, 1977 was that letter.

11 Mr. Holsinger. Right.

12 Mr. Spalatin. Was that the first one, to the best of your
13 knowledge?

14 Mr. Holsinger. I believe that was the first one of the
15 State Department. There were other communications earlier
16 that I am sure -- the reason I am sure of that --

17 Mr. Smeeton. Would they be to Justice also?

18 * Mr. Holsinger. They could have been to Justice. The
19 reason I know it was an earlier communication, either with
20 Justice or State, is because I have here a letter dated --
21 it shows a date, the time stamped in, April 14, 1978, to
22 Congressman Ryan from Reverend Guy Young, Peoples Temple in
23 San Francisco, in which he says that somebody is misusing Leo's
24 name, and indicating an interest in the Stoen case.

25 It is a letter saying how great Jones is and how bad the

See Case Record B - Stoen Case

1 Stoens are. It closes by saying, "I want to forewarn you of
2 this misuse of your name, which I feel sure you would no way
3 condone. Thank you for your attention."

4 This was in response to some communication we made with
5 the State Department or with the Justice about this case.

6 Mr. Spalatin. So prior to --

7 Mr. Holsinger. April 14, which is the date we received
8 it. Prior to that time we had communicated with Justice or
9 State. This was an example of somebody knowing of our
10 interest officially and this was this letter received.

11 Leo's letter of response to this letter was dated May
12 15, 1978 and says, "Dear Reverend Young: Please be advised
13 that Tim Stoen does have my support in the effort to return
14 his son from Guyana. In addition, a long time friend of mine,
15 Bob Houston, a wire service photographer, has told me his
16 granddaughters are being held in Guyana.

17 "I am most concerned about the conflicting reports about
18 access to your church in Guyana. Please let me know if I may
19 visit your camp in Guyana as a part of my official oversight
20 plans for this year.

21 "Sincerely yours, Leo Ryan."

22 Mr. Spalatin. Joe, would it be possible to supply for
23 the record a listing in chronological order of the dates ~~and~~
24 ~~communications~~, either by phone or by letter, of communications
25 from Ryan's office to the State Department?

1 Mr. Holsinger. Yes. I will do that. *Where is A?*

2 Mr. Spalatin. That would be very helpful, especially in
3 *light of* ~~line with~~ your *earlier* ~~observation earlier~~ that you say you found a
4 pattern of reaction to such inquiries coming in subsequent
5 letters from people in support of or in favor of the Peoples
6 Temple, leading you to think that there was some either
7 inadequacy or stupidity on behalf of the State Department or
8 outright complicity with members of the U.S. Government
9 either in the State Department or Justice Department or some-
10 where else, advising Jones and/or Peoples Temple individuals
11 of Ryan's interest in the case.

12 Is that correct?

13 Mr. Holsinger. That is correct. Rather than saying the
14 department, I would say some department personnel, because I
15 do not want to make a statement like that about the department
16 per se.

17 Mr. Spalatin. Okay. So is it safe to say that prior to
18 the December ⁸ ~~7~~ letter you mentioned before to ^{Secretary} Vance there had
19 been prior communications?

20 Mr. Holsinger. Yes, there were.

21 Mr. Spalatin. I see. That resulted ultimately in the
22 December ⁸ ~~7~~ letter.

23 Mr. Holsinger. Yes.

24 Mr. Spalatin. Okay.

25 Mr. Holsinger. There were other cases involved, too,

1 communication on other cases.

2 Mr. Spalatin. Right, but all related to Peoples Temple
3 and Jones and so on.

4 Mr. Holsinger. That is correct.

5 Mr. Spalatin. Tom, if you have anything.

6 Mr. Smeeton. Yes. I ~~just want to follow up a little bit~~
would like to discuss what
happened
7 ~~on the local and state level. I gathered from your earlier~~
8 ~~remarks that they were equally lacking in information or~~
9 ~~interest apparently.~~ In the wake of Houston's death, I gather
10 an investigation was conducted by local authorities and they
11 judged it to be an accident, is that correct?

12 Mr. Holsinger. That is correct.

13 Mr. Smeeton. Was there any effort by people related to
14 that investigation to contact ~~Lee~~ *Congressman Ryan* on it afterwards, after the
15 verdict was rendered that it was an accident, aside from the
16 Houstons?

7 Mr. Holsinger. No. That was our first information. The
8 case had already been decided. They felt it had been decided
9 inadequately.

10 Mr. Smeeton. Did you get the impression it was a very
11 perfunctory type investigation, and that the local authorities
12 might have been intimidated?

13 Mr. Holsinger. I read the record on it. It was late at
14 night, nobody else around. I do not fault the police. I
15 think it was one of those things where they clearly could not

1 ascertain any compelling reasons to believe it was anything
2 other than an accident. It may have been they simply didn't
3 know. But since they had no information, no real evidence to
4 the contrary, they felt compelled to rule it an accidental
5 death.

6 Mr. Berdes. The Houstons felt otherwise on the basis of
7 instinct or factual *evidence?*

8 Mr. Holsinger. On the basis of the fact that their son
9 had told them he was going to leave the Peoples Temple, he
10 told them he was quitting. The night after he told them that
11 he was found dead. They felt it was more ~~than~~ coincidence.

12 Mr. Spalatin. You mentioned also earlier, I think, ~~it was~~
13 the Attorney General for San Francisco, Mr. Freitas.

14 Mr. Holsinger. District Attorney Freitas.

15 Mr. Spalatin. Okay. That Freitas had contacted Ryan
16 because they knew each other earlier, they had a relationship
17 from before, and that he knew of Ryan's interest.

18 Mr. Holsinger. The Stoen case -- District Attorney
19 Freitas had cooperated in getting the court order. The
20 Stoens -- by that time Leo was interested in the case. This
21 had grown out of the Houston matter and others. He was the
22 only one apparently here -- one of the few -- who was
23 interested.

24 They came to him for help because he was on the Inter-
25 national Relations Committee and because he was in a neighboring

1 district, and had shown some interest in the case.

2 * I should say for the record at this point there is a
3 story here I have written by a newsman, a free lance newsman,
4 named Gordon Lindsay, which is the most complete record of
5 the chronology of events dealing with the Peoples Temple.

6 He had been down there, did a lot of investigative work
7 a year at least before Leo got on to the matter. It is a
8 frightening story. He was a free lance writer who had been
9 working with the National Enquirer. He was very helpful to
0 us in our investigation.

1 I would like to make this material available to
2 the committee. However, because it is his personal property
3 and his right, I would give it to you for investigative reasons
4 only and ask that it not be used for any publication prior
5 to perhaps any hearings that might be held because it is his
6 personal property. But it is important to this investigation.

7 Mr. Berdes. The article has never been published, is
8 that correct?

9 Mr. Holsinger. That is correct.

0 Mr. Smeeton. He is still working on it?

1 Mr. Holsinger. I assume so. It is information that is
2 so important I felt you should have it for your investigative
3 work, but not for publication.

4 Mr. Spalatin. You have it here?

5 Mr. Holsinger. Yes.

* See Case Record Q - Gordon Lindsay
story

Mr. Smeeton. A follow-up on this. Is there any substance to the rumor that as early as 1971 or 1972 the religious editor ^{of} ~~for~~ the San Francisco Examiner began a series on the ^{People's Temple} ~~church~~ ^{that} ~~and it~~ was terminated in midstream because of pressure that was brought to bear on the ownership of the paper by Jones and other members of his faith?

Mr. Holsinger. The man's name is Reverend Lester Kinsolving. He did start some articles. There were personal attacks -- I won't say personal attacks -- I mean statements made about him. He was harrassed. I am not sure from what sources.

Mr. Smeeton. Statements made by Kinsolving?

Mr. Holsinger. Against him, vilifying his character, and so on. My impression at the time was he had been driven out of the business because of these attacks on his character. It is true that he was really hounded by the Peoples Temple people. Whether or not they exerted any pressure on the newspaper, I don't know.

But, we do know that the editor of one other large metropolitan paper, according to his own statements--and this is shown in the article--became personally very involved and became convinced of the authenticity of Jones' commitment.

After a couple of years the editor, I think he was probably -- the editor of this paper, the San Francisco Chronicle, was removed as editor, Steve Gavin, because they thought perhaps he may have been compromised in some way, at

1 least his thinking was compromised by the Peoples Temple.

2 But I would like to go back, if I may, to the Gordon
3 Lindsay article for one point I would like to make. Another
4 gentleman you may wish to talk to -- and that is Paul McCloskey.
5 The record shows McCloskey also tried to intervene on behalf
6 of constituents in the Peoples Temple matter.

7 McCloskey stated, and it is shown in here, according to
8 this, if it is true, that he personally knew the Secretary of
9 State, Mr. Vance, and others in there, and he was sure he
10 was going to be able to get some response for them, that he
11 would be able to take care and help them with their complaints.

12 According to the article that is here -- I have not
13 talked to Mr. McCloskey about it -- the article states that
14 in essence Mr. McCloskey came back to them finally and said he
15 was unable to get any action or response in a positive fashion
16 from the State Department, despite his statement that he was
17 personally well acquainted with the top people in the depart-
18 ment and could get some action.

19 I state that because you may wish to talk to Mr. McCloskey.
20 Leo knew of this as well. It was part of his frustration --
21 anybody as dedicated and as competent as Mr. McCloskey is, if
22 he wasn't able to get any action from the State Department.

23 In essence, there was nothing else to do, except to quit
24 or to go.

25 Mr. Berdes. Okay.

At that point, when Leo Ryan made his decision to go to Guyana personally, was the fall of 1978.

Mr. Holsinger. That is correct.

Mr. Berdes. The latter part of September, roughly.

Mr. Holsinger. Well, it was a probability by September.

It was a definite decision made after he returned, after the session was over. He was getting set to go. He had several meetings with the Concerned Relatives after the session of Congress ended. He was home sometime on weekends.

Somewhere in that time, in October, after one of those meetings, he had a meeting with them and said, "Okay, we are going to do it, and let's prepare for it." That was, I believe -- let me see if I can find the date of that. It was at that point that the thing became changed from a maybe to a definite "Yes, we are going to do it."

Mr. Berdes. He has on record here with the committee a letter dated October 4 in which he is requesting Chairman Zablocki's permission to go to Guyana for that purpose.*

Mr. Holsinger. That was in preparation. In my mind at the time, if these interviews -- if anything else turned up to help, or if the interviews with the members of the Concerned Relatives had been such that -- he kept the back door open in his own mind, until the final meeting with the Concerned Relatives.

He made the request indicating that -- the probability of

* In Committee files and related correspondence

going.

Mr. Berdes. Well, he said, "I would like to travel to Guyana during the week of November 12 to the 18th to review the situation firsthand."

Mr. Holsinger. That is correct.

Mr. Berdes. At that time did he direct you or Jackie Speier or anyone else to begin preparations for that effort?

Mr. Holsinger. Yes.

Mr. Berdes. Now, what did he ask you to do?

Mr. Holsinger. Well, he had asked me all along to build a record. But he asked Jackie Speier to get all the information possible on Guyana itself, and the Government of Guyana, on its Constitution, our relations with Guyana, the nature of those relations, information from the Embassy about the mission at Jonestown.

He asked my son and myself to prepare information from the Concerned Relatives, who the children were of the relatives down there who should be contacted, who was likely to be friendly and who was likely to be hostile, the nature of the key people down there on Jones' staff, complete background and case histories on the key people involved, especially those of the staff of Jones and the Concerned Relatives.

Mr. Berdes. This was approximately one month prior to his anticipated departure?

Mr. Holsinger. We started a little before that. I think

we were preparing it as long ago as September.

Mr. Smeeton. In that regard, I recall a press account indicating that around the middle of September, say about the 15th, he met with Assistant Secretary of State Viron Vaky concerning Jonestown and what was happening there. Is that an accurate report? ~~There was something in a press account after this tragedy occurred.~~

Mr. Holsinger. To my recollection, that sounds accurate.

Mr. Berdes. Do you recall anything that he might have said regarding that meeting with Vaky or did he take any notes? Apparently based on that conversation he made up his mind to go. ~~I don't think~~

Mr. Holsinger. Jackie would have those notes.

Mr. Spalatin. Was that the first meeting that Ryan had with State Department officials or not?

Mr. Holsinger. Jackie will know that because I spent the time back and forth ^{from} in the district. Leo used Jackie, who was his Legislative Assistant and legal counsel, for most of the communications with the State Department, not all because I was back and forth and Jackie was here all the time, because she was a legislative aide and legal counsel. He used Jackie for most of the communications with the State Department.

Mr. Spalatin. Do you recall, Joe, offhand if that was the first meeting that Ryan had with the State Department?

Mr. Holsinger. I do not know.

Mr. Spalatin. Okay.

Mr. Smeeton. I got the impression from this article -- I can't recall which paper published it -- ~~indicating~~ that after that particular meeting he made up his mind to go.

Mr. Holsinger. Well, I know for a fact that he always kept a back door open down to the date of this final meeting with the Concerned Relatives.

My son drew up the agenda for the meeting. At the end of that meeting, when they had gone through all of this, it was like a trial run in his head. They went through. He came out of that meeting. He looked at me rather grim faced and said, "We are going."

Up until that time I think he had had the thought in his mind, hoping that it would not be really that -- let me leaf through here and get the exact date for that.

My son, for example, was involved in memorandums such as aircraft arrangements in Guyana. He was checking on transportation, he was checking on all this sort of thing, the list of residents possibly wanting to get out.

All right. The date of the final meeting, the last date, where he came out rather grim and said, "We are going," because they had now gotten down to everything, the last step along the way --

Mr. Berdes. This is the date of the meeting with

1 interested relatives --

2 Mr. Holsinger. Concerned Relatives.

3 Mr. Berdes. -- in California.

4 Mr. Holsinger. In California. I will give you the first
5 sentence from here, the first paragraph from here. It is
6 dated **October 25, 1978.**

7 Quote from Mr. Ryan: "I can, as a Member of Congress, use
8 State Department facilities in Georgetown, Guyana. Bringing
9 other people on the trip brings a different dimension to the
10 trip itself. Final approval for the trip is not in yet from
11 the State Department as per Jackie."

12 He goes on with quite a resume, including a statement
13 that, "I want you to understand my limitations and limitations
14 of the congressional group as a whole."

15 * So, this will be for your record here. It was on that
16 date that the final decision was made to go, **and he was**
17 **rather grim about it because he wasn't looking forward to it.**

18 Mr. Berdes. The date of that is **October 25?**

19 Mr. Holsinger. That is correct.

20 Mr. Berdes. He was requesting the chairman's permission
21 to go on October 4.

22 Mr. Holsinger. That was preparatory. What I want to
23 point out to you is that he knew in advance that he could not
24 make up his mind at the last minute to go and expect to get
25 permission. He was boxed in by a time schedule.

* - See Case Record B1 (Guyana Research)

For example, he had -- let me get my calendar here -- the time of his going had to do with his other commitments as well.

Mr. Berdes. I see.

Mr. Holsinger. At the time he was planning to be back here for hearings on whales, the saving of whales. That hearing he had scheduled here for approximately that time was I believe the 21st and the 22nd of November. Those hearings were later rescheduled for the 28th and 29th of November, but he could only do it between the election day and the hearings scheduled here in Washington.

He was then to go out to the coast for some hearings on the Outer Continental Shelf, oil drilling out there. He was getting ready for it because if he waited until October 25 to go on November 14, it is quite likely he would not have gotten the approval of the chairman.

He wanted to do that before Congress went out of session, obviously. So, he was preparing.

Mr. Berdes. Joe, what I am trying to establish is the time frame within which the decision to go was made and how much time was therefore available for your staff to work together with the State Department to get adequate background briefings.

Mr. Holsinger. The background briefings started, according to my recollection, sometime in the summer of 1978; that is, briefings on a potential trip.

1 Mr. Smeeton. That would be prior to McCoy's reassignment
2 to Washington, correct? So somebody other than McCoy began
3 these briefings, is that right?

4 Mr. Holsinger. I believe so.

5 Mr. Berdes. Who did that in your office -- Jackie Speier?

6 Mr. Holsinger. Yes.

7 Mr. Smeeton. Jackie was the one who handled that.

8 Mr. Holsinger. Yes.

9 Mr. Berdes. In any event, that effort was renewed in a
0 more intensified way sometime in the latter part, ~~the very~~
1 ~~late part~~ of October of 1978, and affected Jackie's request to
2 the State Department for formal briefings, background
3 sessions, and so on.

4 Mr. Holsinger. That is correct.

5 Mr. Berdes. Okay.

6 Mr. Holsinger. As I understand it, since I was -- I
7 went out to the district in, I guess it was, over the Labor
8 Day recess. I then stayed in the district from that point
9 through the election, in the district office. I was also,
0 of course, at the time working with my son on preparing the
1 case from the San Mateo - San Francisco area.

2 Mr. Berdes. Leo left the United States on November --

3 Mr. Holsinger. 14.

4 Mr. Berdes. 14. So what we are talking about ^{here} ~~there~~ in
5 ~~that, in~~ terms of a period ^{for} ~~of~~ State Department briefing, was
5

1 approximately two to three weeks time.

2 Mr. Holsinger. Yes. I have, for example, a copy here of
3 Jackie's report to Leo on the State Department background
4 briefings, which was a fairly light briefing.

5 * Let me get the exact briefing here for you. This was
6 earlier. October 12, 1978 she wrote an interoffice memo,
7 "State Department briefing on Guyana, and Peoples Temple
8 background on Guyana."

9 Now, that was the date of her memo -- I am not sure what
0 exact date she had. But to that she had attached information
1 on the USAID program for U.S. fiscal year 1978 and she also
2 had attached to it from the State Department background notes,
3 Guyana, the Department of State, November 1976.

4 This was all information that she attached to her
5 memo.

6 Mr. Spalatin. Pursuant to the October 25 meeting with the
7 concerned citizens and then Leo's decision to finally go, did
8 he meet again with State Department officials here in Washington
9 and/or did Jackie?

10 Mr. Holsinger. Jackie did.

11 Mr. Spalatin. After October 25?

12 Mr. Holsinger. Jackie did. I am not sure whether he
13 attended any of those or not. He came back to Washington on
14 November 10, on a Friday. He left here on November 14.
15 Whether he participated in any briefings during that period of

* See Case Record F (State Department)

1 time or not, I do not know. I do know that Jim Schollaert from
2 your committee I think was at most if not all State Department
3 briefings with Jackie.

4 Mr. Berdes. Yes, we plan to speak with him. Tom Smeeton
5 was also present.

6 Mr. Smeeton. I was at one that occurred on the 25th of
7 October, according to my notes.

8 Mr. Berdes. Okay.

9 Mr. Spalatin. Did Jackie ever mention to you or in any
10 memorandum to Ryan ~~as to any expression -- how would you~~
11 characterize ^{ing} the State Department attitude about Ryan's
12 decision on October 25 to go, or even prior to that, about his
13 interest of potentially going?

14 Mr. Holsinger. They tried to discourage it.

15 Mr. Berdes. Why?

16 Mr. Holsinger. They seemed to feel satisfied with their
17 reports from the field that it was a benign situation, that
18 they had investigated the reports with the people, the
19 consular people in the Embassy, and so they seemed to really
20 back those up.

21 I think -- it is my own impression, and it was Leo's --
22 that they did not want to make waves, that this was a small
23 country. They were concerned perhaps with the image of the
24 United States as interfering in the smaller countries of
25 Central and South America.

1 That seems to have been a general policy set of noninter-
 2 vention, not only because of the size -- the fact that it was
 3 an independent country, a new emerging country, so to speak,
 4 but also because of the matter of religious involvement,
 5 religious overtones.

6 Their constant theme was this was a matter between private
 7 citizens, that they had no jurisdiction in Guyana, and that
 8 anybody who was down there they assumed from their reports
 9 was down there voluntarily, they assumed were not being abused.

0 They even said in effect that they had a lot more communi-
 1 cations in favor of the Peoples Temple than against it. So
 2 they in effect almost took the matter of communications and
 3 weighed them to see which one weighed heavier.

4 But we did not experience cooperation along the line from
 5 almost any facet of the State Department. In our opinion,
 6 there was definite discouragement of the trip, not for security
 7 reasons, not for reasons of safety, or anything like that,
 8 but whatever reasons we could not determine -- there was a
 9 policy that said let's not get involved.

0 Mr. Berdes. Joe, are you aware or is there ^{evidence} ~~evident~~ in any
 1 of Jackie Speier's memoes, or in her conversations with you,
 2 ^{conveying} ~~conveyance~~ from the State Department ^{to Ryan} ~~of~~ the potential danger
 3 involved?

4 Mr. Holsinger. No.

5 Mr. Berdes. Why, then, was she so apprehensive, as she

1 is reported in the press to have been to the point of having
2 drafted her own will and having a sense of some great fear
3 over this trip?

4 Mr. Holsinger. Because we had gathered the information
5 on the danger. Leo's staff had done it. We knew what the dangers
6 were. We tried to tell the State Department of that, but they
7 ignored us.

8 Mr. Berdes. Did they try to dissuade you from that view?

9 Mr. Holsinger. No, they contended there was no danger.

0 Mr. Berdes. They did try to dissuade you.

1 Mr. Smeeton. ^{from} The information that you acquired, Joe, ^{did}
2 you ~~were able to~~ get the ~~distinct~~ impression there might be
3 real peril to ^{Congressman Ryan} Leo and his party if they went ^{into Jonestown?} ~~in?~~

4 Mr. Holsinger. We considered that possibility. You have
5 to understand that at that time we had conflicting reports,
6 and Leo was really not sure where the truth was. He was there
7 to determine for himself.

8 Mr. Smeeton. During this time frame, was he in touch with
9 Mark Lane, who after the fact now seems to indicate that he
0 was ~~—~~ ^{aware of the potential danger?}

1 Mr. Holsinger. The only communication with Mark Lane
2 here -- I would like to hold that just a minute to respond
3 more fully here.

4 We sent information to the State Department on our
5 findings, what we had found, and the State Department never

used that as a basis for any discouraging of the trip. They would say things like there is difficulty in taking such a large party because of hotel accommodations down there.

It seemed their attitude, if I can capsulize it, was they were annoyed by Leo's troublemaking attitude, and that the concern was not so much -- never any thoughts of danger, they never admitted there was any danger, never thought there was any danger.

But this was simply a matter that they would rather leave alone, and it was just too much trouble for them. But they never ever asked him not to go, and they never warned of any danger. They simply didn't want to be bothered, as evidenced by the refusal to send a legal aide along from the State Department upon his request.

Now, getting back to your question again, sir?

Mr. Smeeton. Well, I was following up regarding Mr. Lane.

Mr. Holsinger. Oh, yes.

Mr. Smeeton. And your determination that there maybe was real peril -- your trying to make a determination, and your getting mixed reports.

Mr. Holsinger. Let me give you the record on this.

Mr. Smeeton. For example, while you are looking, I will just cite from a New York Times article that appeared today in which Lane contends in an interview that Mr. Ryan and the newsmen should have even been more aware of the dangers

than he because they had access to defectors and others opposing the Temple.

Mr. Holsinger. That is the information we passed along to the State Department, which they ignored.

There are State Department wires in here, attached here. Let me get the State Department wires, too.

Mr. Smeeton. The same ~~story~~, New York Times story, that appears in today's paper indicates that Mr. Lane had been tipped off as to what he might encounter there, what the party might encounter, by a Miss Buford, who ^{evidently} ~~apparently~~ very recently defected, within the last month or two, and apparently she told Lane prior to take-off for Jonestown of mass suicide plans, the stockpiling of the arms, and the use of drugs to keep members in thrall.

This is according to Lane. This is a New York Times story as of today. - N.Y. Times article enclosed

Mr. Holsinger. Yes. We were aware of the mass suicide ritual, or claims about it. We had reports about it.

Mr. Smeeton. In that regard, did ~~Lee~~ ^{Compassionate Ryan} have access to ~~that~~ ^{the} affidavit that was submitted by Miss Blakey on June 15, which alludes to mass suicide rituals and so on?

Mr. Holsinger. We didn't get a copy of this, as I recall, until around October because she was one of the people my son was trying to interview. Her attorney kept advising her to stay away, and she finally gave us access to information in

1 **October.**

2 This is a matter relating to Mark Lane. I have here a
3 memo from Jackie to my son, Will, on Guyana research, and at
4 the bottom of that, with my handwriting, is the date 9-25.
5 There was a phone call from Richard McCoy to myself. I might
6 read this as follows:

7 + "Richard McCoy, State Department, Caribbean Affairs, with
8 a phone number, 632-3449, lived in Jonestown 16 months. Mark
9 Lane at 9-19-78 press conference in Georgetown threatened
0 millions of dollars libel action versus Attorney General Bell,
1 CIA, FBI," et cetera.

2 Then in parentheses, "CCI-Citizens Commission of Inquiry,"
3 question mark, end parentheses. This was my question to
4 myself, as to what the CCI meant.

5 Following that at that time --

6 Mr. Berdes. I am sorry. Clarification. You say McCoy
7 lived in Jonestown?

8 Mr. Holsinger. Well, I have Jonestown, but it really
9 was in Georgetown. ^{in error} He had written it down as Jonestown, ^{because}
0 that is the way I wrote it down. However, then on September 26
1 I received communications, Leo got a communication from Ashley
2 Hewitt, Director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs, enclosing
3 a copy of a telegram to the department by the American Embassy
4 in Georgetown, reporting a recent press conference held by
5 the Peoples Temple attorney Mark Lane.

+ - See Case Record B-11 (Guyana)
* - See Case Record H (Stats Dept) (Research)

"Knowing of your interest in the Peoples Temple, I find this report interesting." He had phoned me and I sent it over. I have a copy here of that telegram about Mark Lane and his press conference down there and his claims.

That is for your record.

Following that, Leo sent a wire on November 1 to the Reverend Jim Jones --

Mr. Berdes. 1978?

Mr. Holsinger. 1978 -- concerning his visit. This was after the October 25 meeting, obviously. The letter is a conciliatory letter. It is an evenhanded letter. It is the kind of thing that is very evenhanded. You can read the letter.

Requesting permission to visit there, to meet with them, either in Georgetown or Jonestown, expressing in effect that he wants to talk with the appropriate government officials, and he is interested in their visit to Jonestown, and asking their cooperation. *

Mr. Berdes. Did he share the contents of that letter with the State Department?

Mr. Holsinger. It shows carbon copies to Congressman Derwinski, to John Brady, to International Relations Committee here, and James Schollaert, who had been assigned apparently to go with them.

It does not show the State Department on here. However, this second wire was sent to John Burke, American Ambassador

* - See Case Record H - State Dept

1 in Georgetown.

2 Mr. Spalatin. The same date?

3 Mr. Holsinger. Yes, same date. Then he said to the
4 Ambassador, "This will confirm earlier reports you have
5 received regarding proposed congressional delegation trip to
6 Guyana." This was directly to Mr. Burke.

7 "Congressman Ed Derwinski and I will arrive November 14
8 in Georgetown. We wish to review with you and other officials
9 the agricultural commune operated by Reverend Jim Jones and
10 the Peoples Temple. Look forward to meeting with you.

11 Following is a text of a telegram I am sending to Reverend
12 Jones."

13 So, he sent them the complete text. He is asking in
14 effect for them to help arrange -- from that point on, all
15 his contacts with the Government of Guyana and with the Peoples
16 Temple was to be made through the Embassy because that was
17 advised the proper way to handle it. Leo did everything the
18 right way.

19 Following this there was a communication to Leo from the
20 State Department, stating that the Peoples Temple wanted Leo
21 to work with Jim Jones. The date of this wire --

22 Mr. Spalatin. Jim Jones or Mark Lane?

23 Mr. Holsinger. I mean through Mark Lane.

24 Mr. Spalatin. Okay.

25 Mr. Holsinger. The date of this wire is November 4, 1978.

See Case Record H - State Dept

Mr. Berdes. Was it in response to the letter that you just read?

Mr. Holsinger. Yes, and in this telegram, which I have here -- *

Mr. Spalatin. Is this from Burke now or from --

Mr. Holsinger. Yes, it is from --

Mr. Spalatin. The Embassy?

Mr. Holsinger. It is from the Embassy.

Mr. Spalatin. To Leo.

Mr. Holsinger. And it has the name of John Griffith on it. It is referenced "McCoy Telecon, November 4, 1978." It goes on to state the information about Leo's communication. It had certain demands. They referred to certain demands the Peoples Temple was making, such as having a balanced congressional delegation of the Black Caucus to go, they were to pick the newsmen to go, and Mark Lane had to be there.

Mr. Smeeton. Was Mark Lane ~~just~~ signed on as legal counsel shortly before this? I had the impression Garry was the long time counsel.

Mr. Holsinger. That is part of the story. It said, "The representative also informed counsel that their response to Congressman Ryan's cable would be communicated through attorney Mark Lane." It is signed "Burke."

I should state at this time that the general counsel retained by the Peoples Temple was Charles Garry. My

* See Case Record H State Dept.

1 conversation with Garry at a later date proved that Garry
2 never heard of Leo's wire and never heard of the State Depart-
3 ment response, or the Peoples Temple response. Garry was
4 ready to quit because he had been bypassed and he wanted to
5 see the communications -- I didn't show him these, of course,
6 but I did show him Leo's wire and Mark Lane's response, and
7 Leo's response to Mark Lane.

8 I did not show him the State Department material. I
9 just told him the State Department had advised us to work
0 through Mark Lane.

1 ~~Garry~~ ^{Lane} phoned our office in California, I guess it was --
2 anyhow, he had phoned for Leo around -- I am not sure whether
3 it was the 3rd of February or the 6th of February, Friday or
4 Monday.

5 Mr. Berdes. February? *you mean November.*

6 Mr. Holsinger. November. Excuse me. I am going too fast.

7 He wanted to talk to Leo. Leo ^{and I} had discussed the matter
8 in California and decided the appropriate response would be
9 to have Jim Schollaert, who is an attorney as well as being a
10 member of your staff, for him to respond to the other attorney,
11 since Lane was obviously the attorney for the Peoples Temple.

12 Leo said in effect, "I am a principal, I deal with
13 principals, I will have an attorney respond to the attorney."

14 There was the negotiation for Lane's request that the
15 visit be delayed, to fit his schedule, and so on.

1 So, Leo had Jim Schollaert return the call. Lane
2 apparently was unhappy with that and wrote Leo a letter, a
3 rather scathing letter, a threatening letter, on November 6.
4 It says, "Member of the Bar of the State of New York," but it
5 is written from Memphis, Tennessee.

6 Leo sat down and chuckled when he got the letter. He
7 spend two hours responding to the letter, underlining what
8 Lane had written, and then preparing his own response to it,
9 which went out on November 10. *

0 He wrote it on the 9th, but he left on the 10th and I had
1 it signed for him because he had written it out in longhand
2 and we had it signed for him.

3 Mr. Berdes. Essentially what was Mark Lane's objections
4 and what were Leo's responses, answers?

5 Mr. Holsinger. Lane's objection was that, first in the
6 wire, the wire that came from the State Department, that they
7 have members of the Black Caucus there; that he had to be
8 there as attorney; and that Leo was biased; that the State
9 Department -- Jonestown and the Peoples Temple had been
0 under attack by various agencies of the United States Govern-
1 ment; that they were interfering with the Peoples Temple, a
2 religious organization.

3 He was deciding what kind of action he was going to bring
4 against these agencies of the U.S. Government for violating
5 the rights of his client, that some of the members of the

* - See Case Record H - State Dept

1 Peoples Temple had to flee the United States to experience a
2 freer opportunity to enjoy rights which were not available to
3 them in the United States. The persecution continues.

4 Further, through a witch hunt conducted by a branch of
5 the U.S. Government they will be constrained to accept either
6 of the offers.

7 "You may judge, therefore, the important consequences
8 which may flow from further persecution of the Peoples Temple,
9 which might very well result in the creation of an embarrassing
10 situation for the U.S. Government "

11 Mr. Berdes. Essentially that apparently is what he would
12 have told Leo Ryan if Leo had returned that call to him.

13 Mr. Holsinger. That in addition to the fact that the
14 timing was wrong, that he could not be there, that he had
15 to be there, and they had to have -- they would decide which
16 press should go in, and they would decide who should be on the
17 congressional delegation.

18 Mr. Berdes. May I ask you this. Did Leo Ryan ever
19 express an opinion regarding the adequacy or inadequacy of
20 the State Department's overall handling of this matter?

21 Mr. Holsinger. Yes.

22 Mr. Berdes. Could you quote that opinion as accurately
23 as you possibly can for us?

24 Mr. Holsinger. I am trying to recall what he said by
25 phone from Guyana. It went through our Washington office. I

1 have it now.

2 Mr. Berdes. Prior to his departure?

3 Mr. Holsinger. No, from Georgetown, while he was trying
4 to get over to Jonestown, Thursday night -- he left Friday --
5 the quotation that sticks in my mind, transferred through our
6 office here to me, was that the people down there in the
7 Embassy were a bunch of turkeys.

8 Mr. Berdes. Prior to that?

What were his opinions of State's performance

9 Mr. Holsinger. Prior to that time, before he went, he
10 felt very frustrated, extremely frustrated, by the attitude
11 of the State Department. He felt they were stonewalling him.
12 He felt they were deliberately trying to obstruct his trip
13 and they were trying to discourage him as much as they possibly
14 could, that they didn't want to make waves, to quote him, that
15 they were in his mind abandoning the 1,200 people down there,
16 or so, and that they were -- again using his words -- white-
17 washing the whole thing.

18 Mr. Berdes. And after he got to Guyana, do I understand
19 correctly, he spoke with you on the phone from Guyana?

20 Mr. Holsinger. He did not. He talked to our office here
21 in Washington because it was much closer, and they relayed
22 the information to me.

23 Mr. Berdes. At that time he expressed the opinion that
24 the State Department representatives in our Embassy in
25 Georgetown, Guyana were "a bunch of turkeys"?

1 Mr. Holsinger. Yes. He also said that it was a familiar
2 pattern, that he had had similar difficulties, discouragement
3 by the Canadian Government -- he was invited by Greenpeace to
4 go on the harp seal thing. They had tried to throw obstacles
5 in his way.

6 When he got to Guyana his reports were that he was trying
7 to break through to the American Ambassador, to get his
8 attention. He finally insisted on it and got a meeting of the
9 Concerned Relatives with the American Ambassador. It was at
10 that meeting that for the first time the Ambassador appeared
11 to pay much attention to what was going on.

12 He had to be impressed with those people. They were
13 always being shoved off on somebody else prior to that time.
14 It was at that meeting that the Ambassador became agitated
15 enough upon direct questioning to phone the Peoples Temple
16 house in Georgetown, to start asking some questions, and
17 that was the first break in the wall that Jones had erected
18 around the Peoples Temple through both the Government of
19 Guyana and our Embassy.

20 Mr. Berdes. That is exactly what Jackie Speier ^{said} ~~it is~~
21 ~~in here~~ in a New York Times interview of December 4.

22 Mr. Holsinger. I should tell you that I, of course,
23 have conversed with Tim Reiterman, the reporter for the
24 Examiner, and Ron Javers from the Chronicle, who were both
25 there observing the scene. So, I have not only the comment that

1 came through from Leo's office here, but the comments from the
2 press who survived the attack, and who are back in California
3 now. They, of course, are valuable resources for you as well.

4 Mr. Berdes. Yes. We surely intend to meet with them and
5 interview them.

6 At any time did Leo have any premonition of danger?

7 Mr. Holsinger. He knew --

8 Mr. Berdes. Did Jackie Speier convey to him her own sense
9 of danger?

0 Mr. Holsinger. Both Jackie and I did.

1 Mr. Berdes. Did he share that apprehension?

2 Mr. Holsinger. I would like to describe that situation,
3 if I could.

4 As we went through it, we noticed from the reports and
5 all that we were reading that if these things were even halfway
6 true it was a dangerous situation. It was so bizarre that none
7 of us could comprehend at that time what it turned out to be.

8 I expressed to him my concern that these people -- it
9 could get out of control. If I recall our conversation that he
0 and I had with the NBC-TV crew just before they left, they
1 came up from Los Angeles, I believe it was on the 9th of
2 November, a Thursday evening. We met at the airport Hilton
3 Hotel at San Francisco airport, and were discussing potential
4 danger because they had read the material, they had read this,
5 they were all aware of the danger themselves.

1 They told me they had been in Vietnam, they had been in
2 Ireland, in the Middle East, they were used to combat
3 conditions, but this one looked perilous also, but they were
4 prepared. They had been through combat conditions.

5 Bob Brown, who was the TV cameraman, who was killed,
6 asked Leo -- in order to get them to understand what kind of
7 a man Leo was, I brought out the matter of his visit into
8 Fulsom Prison, his time there, eight days. So, I wanted them
9 to understand each other.

10 Bob Brown asked Leo his account of the prison and how
11 it had been in maximum security, they could have killed him
12 at any time, he was out in the yard with them, but they were
13 testing him, and he was testing them.

14 So, Leo stated his knees were jelly, to go out in the yard,
15 but he had to do it. He was very afraid, but he had to do it.

16 So, Bob Brown asked him, he said, what was the single
17 most important lesson you learned out of your time at Fulsom.
18 Leo paused for quite a while and said, "Well, I guess the
19 most important thing was a negative thing. I learned not to
20 be afraid anymore."

21 He said, "You really can't do your job if you allow
22 yourself to be afraid. You have to put fear behind you."

23 On the next day, on the way to the plane, I took him to
24 the plane and I was trying again to, in effect, not talk him
25 out of it, but perhaps to just caution him.

1 Mr. Berdes. Heighten his awareness of the potential
2 violence?

3 Mr. Holsinger. Yes, we had discussed it many times. We
4 had discussed the fact of taking protection in there. But
5 Mark Lane and others had claimed it a CIA trick. If we took
6 any arms in there, it could be viewed as an armed invasion or
7 an armed sortie.

8 Leo knew that, so the idea of taking arms in there would
9 be viewed as a hostile act. The State Department had no
0 inclination to help. They told us in effect -- one thing they
1 did tell Leo, perhaps between Georgetown and someplace else,
2 was that they had no means at their disposal to protect him
3 if anything should erupt.

4 Mr. Berdes. Was it ever suggested that Guyanese troops
5 might accompany them?

6 Mr. Holsinger. That was Leo's -- I think Leo did request
7 that but was told that the Government of Guyana could not --
8 it was a private matter between two American private groups.

9 Mr. Berdes. You are sure that Leo made such a request?

0 Mr. Holsinger. It was my impression. I am not sure
1 about it. Jackie would be more familiar with that down on the
2 scene.

3 So, in our conversation on the way to the airport we
4 discussed that, that there was no way to take arms in there
5 because it would be viewed as a hostile act, as Americans who

did it because of Lane's claims, among other things, and the Peoples Temples claims that they were being harrassed.

However, Leo said the fact that we will have some media along should be protection because he could not conceive of an attack upon the media. The media, in turn -- I got the report later, in New York -- they felt protected by the fact that a member of Congress was along.

But Leo was -- he felt that he had to solve this problem for these people. So, I said to him finally -- my final act to talk him out of it, to make him aware or do something -- the die is cast, you are trying to say can't we go back -- this summer I took a vacation trip to Europe, my first trip to Europe, and went to run with the bulls of Pamplona.

A friend went along that had been there before. Leo tried to talk me out of that. He almost ordered me to stay at home. He was fretting at me like a mother hen. He insisted I not go.

So, I did, and I ran for the first two days until the riots started and came back. He called me names for it. So, I recalled that to him, on the way to the airport. I said, "My God, to think you were fussing about my running with the bulls in Spain, and here you are going into this thing."

Leo laughed and said, "Well, like I say, you got a job to do, you can't be afraid, you have got to do it." That was my last conversation with Leo, apart from the telephone

conversation, ~~is~~ back here in Washington before he left.

Mr. Berdes. If I can try to summarize what you have just said, the impression is that Leo was aware of potential danger, even to the point of considering requesting military protection from the Guyanese Government.

Mr. Holsinger. That was considered. I don't know whether the request was ever made.

Mr. Berdes. Okay.

Mr. Spalatin. Requested from the State Department?

Mr. Holsinger. The State Department did say, and it is in here someplace -- whether it was down in Guyana or here -- they were not in a position to afford protection to Leo should it be necessary.

Mr. Berdes. But any apprehension that he had had over and above that, he had tried to submerge in keeping with his belief that he had to do so in order to do his job?

Mr. Holsinger. That is correct. None of that element of danger was ever transmitted from the State Department.

Mr. Smeeton. The danger, as I understand it, that was perceived was learned of through contact with defectors.

Mr. Holsinger. Yes.

Mr. Smeeton. They pointed out the potential danger and the hostility that he might encounter. And possibly Lane, too.

Mr. Spalatin. That is what I wanted to ask.

Mr. Holsinger. The only think^g we have from Lane was just

one letter and his conversation with Jim Schollaert. That was it.

Mr. Spalatin. Did you say that Mark Lane contended that taking arms in there would be a hostile act?

Mr. Holsinger. No. Mark Lane had said in his press conference down in Guyana, which was transmitted here, that the CIA and other agencies were trying to infiltrate and destroy the Peoples Temple. Leo felt taking arms in there -- first of all, if the reports of all the guns down there were true, it wouldn't have been a contest anyhow. It turned out they did have considerable ammunition.

So, taking guns in there would have been a provocation and an excuse. They could have claimed ^{Leo's group} they shot first.

Mr. Spalatin. It would afford them that opportunity.

Mr. Smeeton. Well, in that regard, regarding arms and so on and so forth, was ^{Congressman Ryan} ~~Leo~~ ever in contact with the Treasury Department or the Customs Bureau in particular, regarding the smuggling of arms in there?

Mr. Holsinger. I am not sure that we ever made that contact. I know that other people did. I know the reporters did. I know the other people made a request. I am not sure whether our office -- it is my impression that we did not get into that aspect of the case ahead of time.

Could I make a phone call to the FBI waiting for me?

(Brief recess)

1 Mr. Smeeton. Joe, one other question along this line.

2 Based on what I have been able to learn about this
3 cult over the last few weeks -- most of the information is
4 ferreted out of news accounts -- it seems to me, going way,
5 way back to the inception of this Temple in the early days
6 in Indianapolis, whenever Jones perceived a threat to the
7 institution from the outside he resorted to rather intimidating
8 tactics to cope with that threat.

9 In view of that, I was wondering once you and Leo got
10 very much involved in this thing, starting from say early 1977
11 on to the time he departed, did you or Leo or anybody on the
12 staff receive intimidating phone calls or threats from any
13 members of the cult saying that if you pursue this, or
14 went down there, they would take appropriate measures?

15 Mr. Holsinger. No.

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1 Mr. Smeeton. To liquidate you or something?

2 Mr. Holsinger. No. What we did get, we got a tremendous
3 volume of mail from individuals and prominent public figures,
4 state and national, in support of Jones. They would send us
5 endorsements from people. Jones was a master at public
6 relations. Such things as, "You wouldn't want to make a
7 mistake. Look at all these fine people. They are misusing
8 your name." They would send petitions through. They tried in
9 effect political pressure of all types. But they made no
0 threats against us of a physical nature. I don't think they
1 ever anticipated that even if this crazy Irishman were able to
2 get down there he would be able to penetrate the defenses they
3 had built in depth, both through our embassy and the Guyanese
4 government.

5 Now, I would like to spell one other thing out, because
6 I think it is important for your record. It has to do with
7 the press and the media.

8 Mr. Berdes. I was about to ask you where the initiative
9 for the media accompanying Leo on this venture started.

0 Mr. Holsinger. It was not Leo's initiative. Half-way
1 through the thing, as we were getting into it, we received a
2 call from Gordon Lindsay, who said he was doing a story for
3 the National Enquirer. He had heard as a possibility that
4 Leo might go to Guyana to investigate the Peoples Temple.
5 He had a great deal of information, having spend two-and-a-half
years on this, He had been down there, overflown the jungle.

He was on their enemies list, what he called the hit list. And he wanted to know if he could go along if Leo went down. And he also wanted an exclusive for the National Enquirer. The call did not come to me. But a call went to my son, Will. Will told me about the call and asked me about it. I said, well, Leo's instructions at that time were we were not attempting to get any publicity, this was strictly a matter of going down and finding out. He thought that coming back, whatever he found would be made public. And he wanted to build a fire here in Congress to get a fuller scale investigation based upon his initial findings.

When I told ^{Leo} him about the National Enquirer he shrugged and said, "Well, why not. If the guy has worthwhile information." We looked at it and found it was really sensational information. We thought it was sensational at the time.

Mr. Berdes. Do you use that word "sensational" in a pejorative sense?

Mr. Holsinger. We thought it was sensational in terms of being overstated. We couldn't believe it. But we thought it was worth investigating. It turned out to be all too true. But we thought of it in terms of being overstated at the time.

Mr. Spalatin. When was this contact made by Gordon Lindsay?

Mr. Holsinger. I think that was in September. So we said, "Okay, if you want to go along." He was going to do

1 an exclusive story. He called me a little later, because I
2 was in touch by this time, and said that he was having trouble
3 with the National Enquirer. They had, I guess, decided the
4 story really wasn't worth pursuing any more, and they were
5 not going to fund his going to Guyana. He wanted to know if
6 he could go along as part of the congressional party. I said
7 "Absolutely not, of course -- you can't do that." And so
8 he said, "Well, I don't know what I'm going to do. I hate to
9 miss out on the story."

He called back a day or two later and said he had been in touch with NBC television. They were doing a network special on cults and he had talked to the NBC-TV people, and Don Harris in particular, and what about NBC going down, and discussed it with Leo. And Leo said, "Well, if they want to go along, that might be a good way to break it and build up public opinion in this country." At this time he was expecting there was more truth than fiction to the stories and allegations -- by this time.

A few days later -- so that was agreed to. Then a few days later, and I am not sure of the dates exactly -- I will have to check with Tim -- but it was my belief that it was around the third of November, a Friday, that I had a call from Tim Reiterman of the San Francisco Examiner, who had some earlier stories on the Peoples Temple. And he said he had been talking to some Concerned Relatives. They were

1 telling him the possibility that Leo might be going to Guyana,
2 some of the Concerned Relatives -- was there anything to that.
3 And since our policy has always been never to lie to the press
4 you may say "No comment" -- either no comment or you tell them
5 the truth. I said, "Well, yes, as a matter of fact he is
6 planning to go down to Guyana, to the Peoples Temple." He
7 asked when. I said, "Well, he is scheduled to leave around
8 the 14th of November." And this was around the third of
9 November. He said, "Can I go?" And I said, "Well, it's up
0 to you. You know the trip. It's up to your paper what you
1 want to do."

2 He called back and wanted to know whether Leo would get
3 into Jonestown. I said I didn't know. Would Leo take him
4 along? I said I didn't know; he would do everything he
5 could -- but NBC-TV was going. I told him that at the time.

6 I also called NBC-TV that Reiterman had called and the
7 Examiner might be sending somebody. They called back later
8 in the day from the Examiner and said they definitely wanted
9 to go. It seemed the more I told them we couldn't guarantee
0 anything, and the more I down-played it, the more anxious
1 they got to go -- which is something I guess we should all
2 learn about the media.

3 Mr. Spalatin. Could I interject here as an aside.
4 Members of interested families also accompanied Leo on this
5 trip?

Mr. Holsinger. You will find in this record here at the October 25 meeting the plans were finally set. Leo warned them they were going in a separate group.

Mr. Spalatin. They travelled together, did they not?

Mr. Holsinger. No. They travelled from San Francisco to New York alone. He told them what plane he was going to be on. He told them they had to make their own travel arrangements. He just told them what flight he was taking down. They were responsible for their own travel arrangements, hotel accommodations. All he was telling them is where he was going and when.

Mr. Spalatin. How many were in that so-called private group?

Mr. Holsinger. Approximately eighteen. And Leo suggested they pick two or three people as their spokespersons, with which he dealt. They all wanted to go. Jackie's advice was he cut the party of Concerned Relatives to four, allow only four to go from New York to Georgetown. That was Jackie's advice. Leo was very touched by these people and by their eagerness to get down there, and he said it was up to them. He warned them they were not part of his party, but it was up to them to go down there. But he could only deal with a couple of them; he couldn't deal with the whole group.

Mr. Spalatin. So there were eighteen of those people, three of whom --

* See Case Record C-1 (Guyana Research)

Mr. Holsinger. Spokespersons, yes.

Mr. Spalatin. Three to be designated as spokespersons and to whom Leo agreed they would accompany him to ~~Georgetown~~ ^{Jonestown}.

Mr. Holsinger. Well, they all went to Georgetown.

Mr. Spalatin. ~~Jonestown~~ ^{Georgetown} -- excuse me.

Mr. Holsinger. Okay. There was the matter of how much room they had in the plane. By that time it grew a little bit. The Examiner had called. Then over the weekend I was concerned because there were two major papers in the San Francisco Bay area, the Chronicle and the Examiner. And here the man from the Examiner had called us. But the Chronicle also ~~runs~~ ^{had run} stories on this matter. And I was concerned that if we didn't tell the Chronicle, let them know Leo was taking a trip, they would be very upset by unequal treatment of the press. We have always tried for equal treatment if we possibly could.

We agreed that I would call the city editor, Dave ~~Pearlman~~ ^{Pearlman}, of the Chronicle, and I called him on Monday, November 6. What I did was -- the Chronicle had endorsed Leo in the general election, although they endorsed his primary opponent. So I called just to tell Dave thank you for the endorsement, because the election was the next day.

We had had Leo in there in September to meet with the editorial board and discuss his trips to the Middle East, his International Relations Committee work -- because they were not as familiar with what he was doing in IR. Since

he was ^{the} a senior member of the committee from California, I thought it was time he got acquainted with the Chronicle board. They liked him very much. As a matter of fact, he had done an article on his visit with Arafat in the Middle Eastern trip. And the Chronicle was considering publishing his diary of that, without any names of who was saying what. But the Chronicle wanted to have Leo editorialize more, give his impressions, which he refused to do. He said, "This is what happened. My impressions are not germane. This was the dialogue."

They told me later they maybe missed a bet on that.

I called Dave on the sixth and said "Thank you for the endorsement. And by the way, Leo is off on another junket." He laughed at the word "junket." "Where is he going this time?" "Down to Guyana." "The Peoples Temple?" "Yes, the Peoples Temple." He said, "We've done stories on that." I said, "I know you have." He said, "Well, I don't think we can send anybody down there." I said, "We're not asking you. We are just letting you know he is going there."

Then later he called back. He said they might want to do a little story on that. "Do you mind if we do a story before Leo goes, or maybe when he comes back?" I said, "Whenever you want." He said, "Can Leo come in and talk to us?" I said the only time to do it was the next day, Election Day. So Leo went in and talked to Marshall Kilduff

of the Chronicle, who happens also to have been a co-author of the article ^{in New West magazine} The Peoples Temple considered him an enemy.

They put an article in the paper the following day, the day following the elction, which was almost hidden, because it was the day after the election, stating that Leo was going to take this trip.

Then there was a call back late Tuesday afternoon. Kilduff had called after the interview with Leo, and he gave me the same routine, how can they be sure it is worth the money. And I said, "Fine, forget it."

But then finally Ron Javers called back. He said "I have been assigned to go. We have decided to go."

And that is how another man -- the Examiner took a photographer along. There were four NBC-TV crew.

Mr. Smeeton. Reiterman was the Examiner photographer?

Mr. Holsinger. He was the Examiner reporter. Gregg Robinson, who was killed, was the photographer. One person from the Chronicle. And then on Tuesday morning I had a call from a woman on the Washington Post who had somehow heard of this and said they had a man in Nicaragua, I guess it was, who was on their South American area, and gave me his name.

Mr. Smeeton. That is Charles Krause, I guess.

Mr. Holsinger. She gave me his name, Charles Krause. She asked me to get the information to Leo and Jackie that he would be trying to show up in Georgetown -- because by that

time there was considerable difficulty on the part of the newsmen in getting entry visas.

There was an apparent blatant attempt to block their entry by Laurence Mann, the Guyanese Ambassador to the United States here in Washington. They made it very difficult and tried to keep any newsmen, media people, from going in.

So I called ~~her~~ ^{here} -- Jackie ^{and Leo} had just left for National Airport to go to New York, and I had ^{our} ~~her~~ office get in touch with Jackie and Leo at the National Airport to tell them that Charles Krause would be showing up possible in Georgetown from the Washington Post, and I had discussed it with the Post -- to let them know that so when he approached they would know who he was.

By this time we were all paranoid about spies. I even went out on some of my son's interview ^{tapes} ~~tapes~~, just to be around when he was interviewing somebody in a public place, for fear it was a setup, a trap. That's how scared I was. I was tailing my own son on his interviews to be sure he wasn't being set up.

So that was the last member of the press.

You had four from NBC, three San Francisco people, and you had one Washington Post person. That makes a total of eight.

Mr. Berdes. Eight newsmen and eighteen private citizens.

Mr. Holsinger. And Leo and Jackie and Jim Schollaert. A total of twenty-seven.

Mr. Berdes. And the understanding was that of the eighteen private citizens, three would be designated as spokesmen.

Mr. Holsinger. Three or four. First it was two or three. It turned out finally four people went on the plane over to Jonestown, four of the concerned relatives.

Mr. Berdes. Who arranged for the planes? There were two planes that went to Jonestown. Who arranged for those airplanes?

Mr. Holsinger. It is my belief, and I think the record will bear it out -- at least they were considering this -- that the Concerned Relatives would pay for the planes. *

Mr. Berdes. That was your understanding prior to Leo's departure?

Mr. Holsinger. Yes. They discussed where they could get chartered flights. We were told how difficult it was, that the only plane available would be from the government of Guyana itself. We got all sorts of reports on the availability or unavailability of planes and of ground transportation from the air strip over to Jonestown.

Mr. Berdes. Did Leo Ryan ever express to you prior to his departure any understanding of the number of people who would go in and the size of the planes in terms of the number of people who might be coming out?

Mr. Holsinger. Yes. We were told at one time the only things available were two five-seaters. And Leo just said,

* See Case Record G-1 (Guyana Record)

"We'll make that decision when we get there. We will do the very best we can. We will do what we can to find what there is and make the most of it." He said, "We will have to go down there to find out what is really available or not available." We were unable to determine for sure from here. But our record will show how much we tried to get that information.

Mr. Berdes. But there was a fore-thought in Leo's mind on the idea of having space available on those planes to bring people out with him.

Mr. Holsinger. Yes. As a matter of fact, the second plane went over, a small plane went over to bring them out, because he wanted all the transportation he could get by that time -- because of the number of people that appeared to be wanting to come out. He didn't want to leave anybody there in a threatened position who indicated a desire to come out. He did say ahead of time to me and to some of the relatives that if there were people there being held against their will who would choose to leave, that he would personally help take them out. He couldn't conceive of a congressional delegation being impeded. He thought -- really, if you want to know what he really thought was going to happen, I will tell you that.

Mr. Berdes. He expressed these views to you.

Mr. Holsinger. Yes. His opinion was that he would probably be denied access to Jonestown, but that he would take

some Concerned Relatives and the media with him. By this time he had started to think of the media as being his protection. When they came in, he said, "That's pretty good, that could be helpful" -- not only in bringing the message back to this country, but in protecting him, in protecting his party. What he anticipated was he would be denied permission for entry to Jonestown, but somehow he would get transportation over to that area; they would go up to the gates of Jonestown, have the gates locked to them, because it would be their property, and they would not intrude on the private property of the Peoples Temple. But they would make a reasonable attempt to get in, and having the media there photographing that and it being proved that it was not an open place, they would then bring back a report to Congress and to the people of this country showing that it was not what it purported to be. And that was his estimate of what the result would be.

Mr. Spalatin. So he never thought he would get in.

Mr. Holsinger. He was determined to try to get in. But he also said he would have to have the cooperation of embassy and of the government of Guyana to get in. He knew that. He figured he would put pressure on our embassy to put pressure on the government of Guyana, to put pressure on the Peoples Temple to gain access.

He felt that he could exert enough pressure on our government, our embassy officials, to put pressure on the

government of Guyana.

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But given the circumstances, he could not see himself kicking down all the doors. He felt that somewhere along the line he would probably be impeded. But he was going to do everything he could to get in.

Mr. Smeeton. What was his knowledge of the relationship of Jones and his colony to the Forbes Burnham government in Guyana?

Mr. Holsinger. Our reports were that the Peoples Temple had compromised important people in the government, including Laurence Mann, the Guyanese Ambassador here, whose constant companion twenty-four hours a day when he was back in Guyana was Paula Adams, a member of the Peoples Temple, who reportedly had taped their moments in bed together, their times in bed together, had given reports of that to other members of the Guyanese government, indicating in effect they had information on them. We also had reports of a million dollars paid by Jim Jones to Forbes Burnham personally, in the government. These were all reports that we had. We had no verification.

Mr. Berdes. These were from defectors?

Mr. Holsinger. Yes.

Mr. Berdes. This information.

Mr. Holsinger. Yes. And so this was all raw material that we were looking into. We also had reports from defectors.

My son's notes are in here, taken prior to the trip. of his interview with one of the members, the Oliver couple. Let me just read it to you. And this is the most serious thing I have to say today, as far as conjecture is concerned. I am saying it only because it was in the notes, the question raised by the Oliver family. But you will find it in the notes anyhow. So I might as well point it out to you here today.

Mr. Berdes. Would you identify the document.

Mr. Holsinger. The document is dated San Francisco, 9-16-78. These are the notes of Will Holsinger. It is my writing at the bottom identifying his handwriting and his notes. These were interviews with various people. He later transcribed these and some of them were put into typing, about the different people and who they were, both the good guys and the bad guys down there, the dangerous ones and the people trying to get out.

Mr. Berdes.. As seen by the Olivers.

Mr. Holsinger. This headline says "Olivers". I am quoting from here now. "Richard McCoy -- on Jones' payroll?"

Mr. Berdes. Those are very serious allegations regarding the reputation of a State Department employee ^{who} which, as you know, the State Department has investigated and has given him ~~a complete~~ ^{an} exoneraton, in fact suggesting that McCoy was sensitive enough of the possibility of compromise to the extent

* - See Case Record G-2 (Guyana Research)

that he went to great lengths to avoid it. One is therefore compelled to point out that those are allegations.

Mr. Holsinger. I stipulate that these are allegations, a question raised by the Olivers to my son on September 16, 1978.

Mr. Berdes. I understand that.

Mr. Holsinger. This is not a charge. The question mark is on here. And this is a question that they raised with my son.

Mr. Berdes. Did they elaborate on that in detail?

Mr. Holsinger. I would have to ask my son. This is a note that he made. All I have here is this note.

Mr. Berdes. Your son is in San Francisco now. Is he still in the employ of Congressman Ryan?

Mr. Holsinger. No. He was only on a part-time basis from September 11 to November 11.

Mr. Berdes. Will he be available to us for an interview?

Mr. Holsinger. Yes. I think upon the basis of all the tapes and interviews he did, you may well want to talk to him.

Mr. Berdes. Tom, why don't you pursue that line you just raised here.

Mr. Smeeton. Regarding the relationship between Jones and his ~~followers~~ ^{followers} and the Forbes Burnham government.

Mr. Berdes. Can we make sure as we move through this ~~are~~ ^{that} we establish whether these are allegations, speculations

or whether there is any ^{substantiating} evidence ~~to substantiate by way~~
~~of~~

Mr. Holsinger. I would say as this point these were practically all allegations that Leo went down to investigate.

Mr. Smeeton. As I recall, you indicated that the source for the information you just gave regarding the connections between the Jonestown hierarchy and Forbes Burnham came from defectors. Would you be in a position to indicate which ones?

Mr. Holsinger. That is in the record. *

Mr. Smeeton. It is all in the record.

Mr. Holsinger. Yes.

Mr. Smeeton. And would you be in a position to tell us which ones can be reached, [?] ~~and so on?~~

Mr. Holsinger. Yes. We have in the record also names, addresses and telephone numbers of practically all of these people, the ones who survived.

It is ironicto note, just for your information at this point, that when the little plane, the small plane got out of there -- they would have massacred them also --

Mr. Smeeton. This is the one that contained the NBC producer, Mr. Flick.

Mr. Holsinger. No, I don't think so. He got out the next day. This was the time of the massacre. There were four crew members and one woman who apparently was wounded in that small plane -- four crew members plus the one woman lying on

* - See Guyana Research G-1-6-5

NOTE: This statement in error - the woman on the phone was Monica Bagley, not Carol Houston Boyd.

floor of the plane. Those five got out. Her name, ironically, is Carol Houston Boyd. She was Sam Houston's daughter and Bob Houston's sister. She was the aunt of the two little girls. It is ironic that she was the one person who got out in that little plane.

It started a year-and-a-half ago in San Bruno and wound up with her being the one person who got out in the plane.

It is our speculation, backed up by some, I guess, reports from there that the original plan was for Larry Layton to shoot the pilot in midair, and they would all go down in the jungle. And that is why Jones boasted to Garfey and Lane that he, God, would see that they perished. When the two planes showed up that became a difficult problem.

Mr. Berdes. I'm sorry. Can we backtrack just a moment. Were there two planes used to bring the party into Jonestown?

Mr. Holsinger. No, one.

Mr. Berdes. Did it then return to Georgetown?

Mr. Holsinger. I am not sure whether it stayed there or returned. But I do know Leo asked for an additional plane to come out because there were more people coming out. The plane going out --

Mr. Smeeton. That was the Cessna, I think. Wasn't the Otter the bigger of the two planes? I think it ^(the Otter) was disabled during the attack.

Mr. Holsinger. The other one left under fire. Leo called

for an additional plane to take more people out. And besides that Mark Lane and I think a member of the Peoples Temple from Georgetown were staying behind. And then he needed additional planes.

Mr. Berdes. Do you know what means of communication he used?

Mr. Holsinger. With Jonestown?

Mr. Berdes, From Jonestown to Georgetown.

Mr. Holsinger. The only communication was the Peoples Temple radio.

Mr. Smeeton. That would be from Jonestown to their Georgetown headquarters?

Mr. Holsinger. Yes. I don't know any other way he could have -- it may have been that the Deputy Chief of Mission may have used -- I would assume the Deputy Chief of Mission was the one who got the message back for Leo to Georgetown.

Mr. Berdes. We can establish this with Jim Schollaert tomorrow, because he spoke with Leo while Jim was in Georgetown and Leo was in Jonestown.

Mr. Holsinger. All right. Now, what happened was when Layton opened fire, the gun jammed. That was a signal for the attack from the flatbed truck and the tractor. And his gun was wrested away from him. He was searched before he got on the plane. What happened was that Leo was very aware of

the danger. Peoples Temple refugees were saying watch that guy, he's not one of us. My report is he got on the small plane and said Leo wanted him on that plane. Apparently Leo -- I'm not sure what the circumstances were -- they said they were going to be searched. He came back out of the plane and Tim Reiterman of the San Francisco Examiner searched him. He got back on the plane and opened fire. Whether he had secreted the gun on the plane or hidden it in his crotch or someplace we don't know. But the report that I got was that the intention was to kill them all, the entire party, get rid of their bodies, and claim they didn't know what happened to them. But when the small plane got away and escaped, they knew that that plan failed, and that is why they didn't stay and kill everybody.

They went back to the Peoples Temple to report to Jones. And that is when the rest of it came into action.

We knew about the proposed suicide ritual because we had been told that Jones, even in San Francisco and elsewhere, he would go to extreme psychological lengths to test people. He would have them sign confessions of crimes they didn't commit. He would have them sign a statement of sexual perversion that never happened. He twisted them into trust, trust, trust. And then told them "We are all going to commit suicide, we will all drink this and in thirty minutes all of us will be dead."

Mr. Spalatin. You knew all this before.

Mr. Holsinger. Yes, these were the reports.

Mr. Spalatin. Based on allegations made by defectors.

Mr. Holsinger. Yes. Then after forty-five minutes Jim would laugh and say, "Trial run; just wanted to see if you trusted me."

So you hear those things. And they did it repeatedly. You begin to think of it more as a way of holding together, not as something you intend to do but as a way of proving control. And that is the way we thought of it. Some people said, "Hey, it is real." But how do you know? Leo went down to find out.

But we knew of the reports of the heavy gun concentrations there. We had heard report of the gun-running. We heard it was with the complicity of the Guyanese government. It could only have happened with their complicity. That could only have been done with the approval and knowledge of the Guyanese government, no other way.

Mr. Smeeton. All of this again was from defectors. None of this you learned through the executive branch or the State Department.

Mr. Holsinger. No.

Mr. Smeeton. You didn't learn anything, *from Executive Branch sources* about the possible connection between the Forbes Burnham government and Jones.

Mr. Holsinger. We had been told there was that connection

before we went down.

Mr. Smeeton. By the State Department?

Mr. Holsinger. No. The one thing the State Department did to us was to suggest to be careful with Laurence Mann, the Ambassador from Guyana to the United States.

Let me go into the story of how difficult it was -- how difficult they made it for the media to go along.

When the NBC-TV crew tried to get in they said unless they had this very day -- unless they had all the information, the serial numbers of the cameras, who was in the party, all their social security numbers, all their IDs, and the records of all their equipment and the serial numbers, they wouldn't be allowed in. This was on a Thursday afternoon.

Mr. Spalatin. This is when the group was in Georgetown?

Mr. Holsinger. No, this was here. This was on the ninth of November. And this was at the same time that we were meeting with the NBC-TV crew in San Francisco. They told us about it. They said all these restrictions had been placed on them. But they had beaten it by seven minutes, because they had an affiliate here in Washington to give them the list of things and delivered all the information with seven minutes to go, seven minutes before five on the ninth of November. And of course the Embassy never thought they could do it.

When the Examiner and the Chronicle got in touch, some

^awomen answered the phone and said, "We have tomorrow off and we can't get to it until Monday and that's probably too late." They were calling us frantically from the two newspapers for help. They finally went along with Leo just on trust because they had no idea whether they were going to be let in the country or not. And this was the same ambassador from whom we had reports of being compromised by the Peoples Temple, the girl in Guyana.

Mr. Smeeton. Where was he during all of this time?

Mr. Holsinger. Apparently in Washington.

Mr. Smeeton. When you left --

Mr. Berdes. I'm sorry. Let's establish who "he" is.

Mr. Holsinger. Laurence Mann is the Ambassador from Guyana to the United States.

Mr. Smeeton. Now, as far as you know, he remained in Washington. He did not go to Georgetown.

Mr. Holsinger. As far as I know. He may have gone down, I don't know, when Lane went down. But I am not sure of that.

Mr. Berdes. You realize the seriousness of these comments.

Mr. Holsinger. Yes. That is why I am here.

Mr. Berdes. Of course.

Mr. Holsinger. I am here for Leo. I want to talk a little bit later about the conversation I had with Garry about Mark

Lane and so on. Because I had that conversation.

So let me know when you want to go into that.

Mr. Spalatin. I want to hear that, of course. The scenario is getting a little muddy for me.

Mr. Holsinger. I'm sorry.

Mr. Spalatin. No -- we are trying to catch up with you. I'm just curious at the November 9 meeting in San Francisco, with the NBC people and Leo -- and I believe you were there, too.

Mr. Holsinger. Yes.

Mr. Spalatin. And there was discussion of potential harm or safety considerations or violence. And the NBC people --

Mr. Holsinger. They were taking the biggest, strongest guys they could find. They expected possible physical violence, beating up.

Mr. Smeeton. Bob Brown apparently was quite concerned, is that correct, based on news stories.

Mr. Holsinger. Bob was --

Mr. Smeeton. He told his family "Don't expect me to come back" or something *like that.*

Mr. Holsinger. I don't know about that. But Bob -- I ~~don't know whether~~ *believe* it was ~~Bob or~~ Don Harris who told me, he said that Bob was the toughest buy he had seen and that he would go with him through hell, because Bob was really so fearless and such a courageous man, that he said

he was the finest person he ever met in his life. And Bob impressed both Leo and myself as a very quiet but very worthwhile and strong person. Don spoke about having big people. When I met Tim Reiterman at the airport I said to Don "Is this guy big enough for you?" because we were expecting possibly intimidation tactics.

Mr. Spalatin. My question was did the newsmen express this need? Did they confirm your and Leo's position not to have armed individuals with you?

Mr. Holsinger. Yes. They knew it would be helpless if the reports were true, they would be outgunned. They also knew it could be used as a provocation. As later stated, Leo felt safety with them and they felt safety with Leo.

Mr. Spalatin. They flew down from New York to Georgetown.

Mr. Holsinger. They left at three o'clock in the afternoon from New York. That was the scheduled time of departure. It was scheduled to arrive in Georgetown around 11:30 at night. My information is that they arrived around midnight in Georgetown.

Mr. Spalatin. And then the next day they met with the Ambassador.

Mr. Holsinger. No. It took a while to get to the Ambassador. They got there -- the next day, the 15th, was a Wednesday. And Leo had stayed at the Ambassador's home. The rest of them stayed at the hotel.

Mr. Spalatin. Was the Ambassador there with ~~them?~~ ^{him?} ⁸⁶

Mr. Holsinger. At the Ambassador's home, yes. Burke was there. And Leo was trying to convince Burke of the seriousness of the situation. Burke was not really -- he was backing and filling and pushing off, according to Leo. Leo went over to the Peoples Temple house and said, "Hey, I'm the bad guy; do you want to talk."

Leo began a series of maneuvers designed to break down the resistance to at least meeting with people from the Peoples Temple. He came back and reported to the press. I think we went over that visit. What happened was he decided on the spur of the moment to go over there, because he was being frustrated. The only news person around was the man from the Washington Post. So he said "I'm going to go over. Do you want to go with me?" The other newspapermen were unhappy he had just picked one of them to go. But it wasn't planned. He said, "Let's do something," and he went. And their guy was ^{the Washington Post man,} there, and he said, "Do you want to go with me?"

Mr. Spalatin. This is the Peoples Temple in Georgetown.

Mr. Holsinger. Yes, at their house there. And there was an interview on that by somebody printed in the paper. One of the other newsmen himself went over later. They were trying to probe and push in. I am not sure when the meeting with -- Leo finally arranged a meeting, I think it was on

6 1 Thursday, with the Ambassador, with concerned relatives. They
2 were trying to run time out. "Sorry, you didn't try hard
3 enough," and they would have alibis about what happened.
4 It was only during that meeting with the Ambassador that
5 they get began to get through to him. It is one thing to read
6 reports, read letters. But these people were so real and
7 genuine that it began to get through to the Ambassador.
8 With Leo sitting there -- and Leo didn't participate. He let
9 the concerned relatives talk to the Ambassador. But the
10 Ambassador was shaken, so much so that he said "I have to
11 start believing some of this." *Jimeme said,* "Why don't you pick up the
12 phone and call the Peoples Temple House here in Georgetown
13 and tell them you want to be able to come out there." He
14 did. That was the first crack in the whole elaborate structure
15 of protection. Because that call, according to Jim Schollaert --
16 he believes that that call was what started Jim Jones to
17 crack, because this was the first fissure. He knew once they
18 got in there it was going to be like breaking through a thin
19 line. That is when Jones called for Mark Lane and Garry and
20 that is -- I'm not sure of the time but it appears to be a close
21 sequence in time between that meeting with the Ambassador
22 and the decision to have Lane and Garry come down.

23 Mr. Smeeton. After that meeting with the Ambassador,
24 the American Ambassador, Mr. Burke, Lane and Garry then
25 immediately flew to Jonestown?

1 Mr. Holsinger. They may have been on their way before
2 that, because Leo was exerting all sorts of pressure and the
3 media were there. I think they were saying to themselves in
4 effect, "Hey, Ryan is ^{winning} meeting with the press." They were
5 beginning to realize that Leo simply wouldn't be put off. They
6 went down there to negotiate.

7 Mr. Smeeton. They didn't participate in this session.

8 Mr. Holsinger. No. As a matter of fact, the newsmen
9 were barred from that session by the Ambassador. The newsmen
10 were kind of ticked off. But some of the concerned relatives
11 came out and gave the results of their meeting to the newsmen.
12 So I am not sure of the sequence. I think almost certainly
13 because of the time that Garry and Lane would have had to be
14 down, on the way, while this meeting was taking place -- but
15 because there were already press stories coming out, and
16 they were taking the definite bent that they were being
17 denied the right of access to this place that you could
18 supposedly get in and out of. Leo was beginning to win the
19 public relations battle.

20 They had a party Thursday night. And it was during
21 that -- the decision was still up in the air as to whether
22 to get the party into Jonestown. Apparently Garry and
23 Lane, whose job it was to conduct public relations probably
24 more than legal work for the Peoples Temple -- and I will
25 come back to that -- they were supposed to be the experts

1 on this. And they advised Jones that he had to let Leo in
2 because otherwise there would be too much doubt, and it would
3 be a significant victory for the concerned relatives if they
4 didn't let them in. And so --

5 Mr. Spalatin. Excuse me. Do you know, Joe, when this
6 consultation between Lane and Garry and Jones took place? Was
7 it from Georgetown?

8 Mr. Holsinger. It was on the radio. It had to be on
9 the shortwave radio.

10 Apparently Lane and Garry, according to their own account,
11 and according to Jim Schollaert, who was there, and according
12 to Leo's phonecall that night up here -- that is the night
13 he said they were a bunch of turkeys.

14 Mr. Spalatin. Thursday night.

15 Mr. Holsinger. Yes. It looked like they might be getting
16 in. At first only Leo, ~~only~~ and a couple of concerned
17 relatives, no press. That was their demand. And Leo held out
18 for the media by that time because he was beginning to
19 realize even more and more as he went along each day that there
20 was significant danger. So he again was looking at his only
21 protection being the media. So when it came time when Jones
22 finally agreed to have them come out, that is when Garry
23 and Lane claimed that Leo kept changing on them, because
24 they thought at first they had them convinced to go out by
25 himself ~~of~~ ^{with} a couple of concerned relatives, and when he

insisted on taking

1 the media or the trip was off, they were in a position of
2 trying to bar the media, and they realized they could not
3 support that position.

4 So the party that went out, to the best of my recollection,
5 included Leo and Jackie. Leo directed Jim Schollaert to stay
6 behind to keep control of things in Georgetown. It contained
7 four members, *of the concerned relatives, and* -- all of the press, the eight members I mentioned.
8 It contained Lane and Garry, one member of the Peoples Temple
9 from Georgetown, a member of the government of Guyana, one of
10 their protocol officers, and the Deputy Chief of Mission.

11 There was only room for three relatives on the plane. Leo
12 explained to them that it is more important for their children
13 and their relatives to have the media on the plane than for
14 them to be on personally. And they agreed to that. But Leo
15 wanted one more person on the plane. He whispered to ~~them~~ *her*
16 to stand by. At the very end, he opened the door and beckoned
17 to Carol Houston Boyd and said, "Come on." That is how Carol
18 got on the plane, because Leo knew he was going to do it all
19 along. They were just waiting until he said "This is all
20 we can take," and then he put one more on.

21 Mr. Berdes. Where was she?

22 Mr. Holsinger. She is the one that got out. *(NOT correct according to later info)*

23 Mr Spalatin. After the shooting, she got out with the
24 four crew members.

25 Mr. Holsinger. Again, the thread runs through this.

Again, this is not correct. I now know
that it was Monica Bagley who got out. 91

1 Mr. Smeeton. She was shot on the plane, is that right?

2 Mr. Holsinger. The daughter of Sam Houston, the sister of
3 Bob Houston, the last one that Leo squeezed on the plane going
4 out to Jonestown. She was also the one who escaped coming
5 back on the small plane under fire. She was the aunt of the
6 two little girls. And so Schollaert told me how Leo arranged
7 that, to get her on the plane, even though they said there
8 wasn't room. That is who went out to Jonestown.

9 Mr. Smeeton. She was the one who was ~~apparently~~ *allegedly* shot
10 by Mr. Layton. Isn't that the allegation?

11 Mr. Holsinger. Yes. That is how she was on the floor
12 of the small plane. When they took off, she was there.

13 Sam Houston's wife was also in Georgetown. And she happened
14 to be -- the Peoples Temple had specifically requested that
15 Mrs. Houston, Carol's mother, Sam's wife, be one of the people
6 to come out. When they were talking about the party earlier,
7 Leo and just three or four members of the concerned relatives,
8 and maybe Jackie, and no newsmen, they requested not Carol
9 Houston Boyd but Carol Houston Boyd's mother, Sam's wife, who
0 is a very nice person, but obviously not very strong. And so
Leo made sure it was Carol who went out rather than her mother.

(The People's Temple)
But they were going to take out people they felt were fairly
weak out there.

Let me talk about Charles Garry for a moment. You will
probably want to talk to me later when you review this material.

1 And then I have a very serious allegation to make of what
2 I have been told about Garry's and Lane's method of leaving
3 Jonestown after the didaster.

4 When I was talking to the Chronicle and Examiner on
5 Friday, I was delivering them copies of Leo's wire to Jones,
6 of Leo's wire to the U.S. Embassy, of Lane's letter to Leo
7 and Leo's response. I went downtown to San Francisco to deliver
8 those personally. They had suggested strongly that I talk
9 to Charles Garry, who was raising all kinds of public relations
0 hell because he had not been consulted, and he was their
1 attorney. I called him and he wanted to see me. So when
2 I went downtown, I stopped first by the Examiner, then the
3 Chronicle. Then I went out to see him. I spent two-and-a-half
4 hours with him, from about five o'clock to seven-thirty on
5 Friday afternoon, November 10.

6 Garry was very upset because he was the general counsel
7 for the Peoples Temple and why hadn't we been in touch with
8 him; he was right there in San Francisco and so were we. I
9 showed him Leo's wire, showed him the wire to the State
0 Department -- to Ambassador Burke. I did not show him
1 the wire back from the State Department because I wasn't sure I
2 could. I just told him the emphasis was they had selected
3 Lane as their attorney. He said did they say "attorney". I
4 said that was my understanding. And he was very upset. I
5 said "It seems to make more sense to us to have contacted

1 you because Leo was here and you were here." Parenthetically
2 I want to point out about the retainer. We were told, allegation
3 is made of a very heavy retainer to Garry from the Peoples
4 Temple. The information that was alleged was \$15,000 a month.

5 Mr. Spalatin. From the Peoples Temple to Garry.

6 Mr. Holsinger. To Garry. That had been going on for
7 quite some time. So I told Garry -- showed him the correspondence
8 He was very upset. I said, "Mr. Garry, I knew that you were
9 the general counsel of record." But I said, "I did not know
0 whether you had been fired or not by the Peoples Temple. When
1 we communicate with a principal and the principal designates
2 his attorney for that action, it is not up to us to call the
3 former attorney possibly and say 'Have you been fired'". So
4 I said "The fact that you were not aware of all of this indicates
5 to me that somebody has aced you out of a pretty good thing."

6 And I said, "Maybe you better be in touch." He said, "I
7 already have." He said, "If they don't give me satisfaction
8 I will take all the files, everything I have here, and ship
9 them right down there."

0 He had introduced Mark Lane to Jim Jones. He had
1 known Mark Lane for many years. They were old friends. He
2 was the one that introduced him. And he was pretty upset
3 with Mark Lane possibly. There was a lot more that went on,
4 but I will give you a few highlights.

5 He told me about how happy the people were, how he

1 was personally sure of all this. And I nodded. And he finally
2 told me about the radio messages that had come up saying
3 how happy people were.

4 I said, "I've heard all that, know all about that."
5 I said, "As a matter of fact, if you are not aware of it now
6 be aware the Concerned Relatives have been monitoring all
7 your broadcasts and taping them." I said, "In one of those
8 broadcasts, they forgot to turn off the switch and they have
9 it on tape someone plainly saying, "No, no, don't say it this
0 way, say it that way." And he paused and looked at me and
1 said, "Yes, I'm sure that happened. I don't see anything wrong
2 with that. I'm sure they were just helping them out." But
3 he blanched. He was taken aback. Because up to this time I
4 had been just a nice guy. At that point he understood that I
5 knew more about it than he thought I did.

Now, as a result of that meeting he was going to
call me back when he found out what was going on. He never
called me back. I made numerous phonecalls to him, and
he refused to return any of the calls. That is prior to
Leo's leaving. Because he had said he wanted to talk to Leo
about it, to let him know what the situation was.

Now, I have a story coming out of the massacre, and I
do not want to quite my source on this. But the story
that I got was -- and maybe second- or third-hand, but it
should be investigated and followed up -- that when they were

1 told to stay behind because they were supposed to mediate
2 a family dispute -- that was their story -- Jones told them
3 that Ryan would be killed, the Ryan party would be killed,
4 that God would take vengeance on them. He didn't say how.
5 He just said God would judge them and kill them. Because
6 they were scared -- because they had the knife attack that
7 occurred by a man named Don Sly.

8 Mr. Spalatin. Did Ryan know about this message?

9 Mr. Holsinger. No. *The Ryan party was*
10 *Leo's death* ~~This was~~ on their way back at the
11 airport, when the assassination was going to occur. Jones
12 claimed ~~it~~ *it* was going to occur. And Lane and Garry both
13 said that conversation occurred between themselves and Jones.
14 When things started getting pretty heavy there, Jones told
15 Garry and Lane, according to my information, they were upset,
16 talking to Jones -- and he said -- well, they didn't know how
17 to get out of there. He said, "I'll give you a guide." He
18 brought up a guide to aid them to safety. And the name of
19 the guide, just to show you the control Jones had of his people,
20 the person who my information said led them to safety, was
21 Don Sly, the man who had put the knife to Leo's throat.

21 Mr. Smeeton. He is the one who *reportedly* tried to knife Leo in the
22 compound.

23 Mr. Holsinger. He was a big, strong man, six-foot-three.
24 He already had the knife at Leo's throat. Leo ducked it,
25 practically throwing him over. But I have no doubt in my mind

1 it was a put-up job; that this was meant as part of the
2 rehearsal, the theater involved, that this was the opening
3 gun, and that Sly was not to slit Leo's throat in front of
4 everybody. It was a pre-staged drama.

5 Mr. Smeeton. As I recall, Joe, doesn't that conflict with
6 news accounts which seem to indicate that two armed guards
7 confronted Garry and Lane when things got tense?

8 Mr. Holsinger. I am saying that is their story. The
9 story that I have is completely different.

10 Mr. Smeeton. Okay. And they asked for directions --
11 they said they were going to record it for history.

12 Mr. Holsinger. From what I have heard, that is a
13 manufactured story. I want that story checked out about
14 Don Sly. I am saying there is another version of this.

15 I would also like to point out for the record, and check
16 this with Dwyer, the Deputy Chief of Mission, who is supposed
17 to have said that Leo was the most courageous man he had ever
18 seen, because even after the knife attack, instead of Leo
19 running over to the truck and being afraid, Leo insisted on
20 staying behind to make sure that all of the concerned relatives,
21 all of the people that wanted to leave would leave. And the
22 Deputy Chief of Mission had to order Leo out. In the name
23 of the government he pulled rank on him, because Leo wasn't
24 going to leave until every person that wanted to leave would
25 leave. Leo said to stay around and make sure they all got out.

1 And Dwyer finally had to order him out.

2 The point needs to be checked, not only because of the
3 conflicting stories about them being given a guide by Jim
4 Jones personally, which would indicate that Jim Jones wanted
5 them to tell his story, but because of the possibility that
6 Sly might have not died but might have gotten out with them.

7 Mr. Berdes. Has it been established whether Sly is dead
8 or alive?

9 Mr. Holsinger. I don't know.

0 Mr. Smeeton. I don't think so yet. I have seen nothing
1 regarding that.

2 Mr. Holsinger. If that story is true, Sly could be loose.

3 Mr. Berdes. And Lane and Garry would know it.

4 Mr. Holsinger. Because they showed up along in Georgetown
5 without having known the country -- they somehow made their
6 way miraculously back to Georgetown on their own. Not to
7 the Matthews Ridge, not to the enacmpment up there, where the
8 Guyanese government had a military establishment, but all the
9 way back to Georgetown, alone, through impenetrable jungle.

0 Come on!

1 Mr. Smeeton. I was under the impression they had caught
2 a flight out. That is false information, then.

3 Mr. Holsinger. I am not sure how they got out. I just
4 don't know. The point is it was very difficult for anybody
5 who didn't know that country, almost impossible to get through.

1 When I had the information about Don Sly and Jones's
2 control -- I think it should be checked. That is an allegation
3 but I think it is important enough to run down.

4 Mr. Spalatin. Time ^{Magazine} reported, for whatever that is worth,
5 that they had found somebody in that native community who
6 got them a plane to get them back to Georgetown. I just
7 repeat what I read last night.

8 Mr. Holsinger. I know. But I think that that needs to
9 be gone over and over and checked completely. Because this
0 was the man who put the knife to Leo's throat. This was the
1 man who was obviously a conspirator in the murder of Leo.

2 Mr. Smeeton. Come to think of it, in the Newsweek and
3 Time accounts I think -- was it Krause that went back?

4 Mr. Spalatin. He went back two days afterwards.

5 Mr. Smeeton. He was looking --

6 Mr. Spalatin. No -- at the time.

7 Mr. Smeeton. This was after the massacre ~~and so on~~. He
8 went back and made a ^{special} ~~specific~~ effort to look for people who
9 had either led the assault on the parties boarding the plane
0 or had been bad guys in the compound. And I don't recall
1 Sly's name being mentioned.

2 Mr. Holsinger. Can you imagine the circumstances now --
3 and I am just going to look at the possibility here -- just
4 the possibilities. If Sly were the one who led them out, and
5 he were the one who put the knife to Leo's throat, making him

1 obviously an accomplice in the conspiracy to murder, if he
2 led Lane and Garry out, does that in any way implicate them
3 and make them involved to any extent, if they accepted his
4 help and knew what happened. Where does that place them? I
5 don't know.

6 Mr. Berdes. Would you be willing to share the source of
7 that information with the committee in closed session?

8 Mr. Holsinger. I would have to ask the party involved.

9 Mr. Berdes. Is there anything else, Joe?

10 Mr. Holsinger. I think there has been enough. What I
would prefer to do is to bring you back a complete set of
information of what I have, and try to arrange it for you
in an orderly sequence. And I will also try to give you
this chronology. I will have to go through all our files
on this. But you know why I am here. I will give you full
cooperation.

Mr. Smeeton. You will probably get this transcript
in a couple of days. Then we can all review it to see how it
turned out. It may be that we may have to at least for the
moment, consider portions of this to be considered taken in
executive session.

Mr. Spalatin. I think right now --

Mr. Smeeton. I think maybe the whole thing for openers
should be treated that way.

Mr. Holsinger. I would agree with that -- because I am

1 nervous about what we are dealing with.

2 Mr. Smeeton. This is pretty sensitive information.

3 Mr. Holsinger Leo was a very patriotic guy. I have no
4 intention on my part to compromise anyone in any way.

5 I would like to leave one thing behind with you. And
6 this is, as I said, confidential. This is something that is not
7 for publication. This is the personal property of somebody
8 else. What I am referring to is these documents from Gordon
9 Lindsay.

10 Mr. Berdes. Is this the article itself?

11 Mr. Holsinger. Yes. I don't believe it is complete.

12 Mr. Smeeton. You mentioned Gordon Lindsay. I notice a
13 Robert Lindsay has been writing some recent accounts. He
14 is a new name as far as I'm concerned on this story. I was
15 wondering if he is the same guy.

16 Mr. Holsinger. I don't know.

17 Mr. Smeeton. ^{He apparently corresponded for the New York} ~~It is a new man on~~ the Times. These are
18 specials. ^{for} ~~This is~~ the New York Times. ~~And these are specials.~~

19 Mr. Holsinger. No, no. I know about this one. On
20 this one, this is San Francisco. Well, I can't say for sure.
21 I know that this particular account, in the New York Times,
22 was arranged by Autumn Ryan, Leo's mother. The New York
23 Times called. She has been a newspaper person herself. And
24 so we are protecting Jackie, as you know. Another time I
25 would like to talk to you about my efforts to get protection

1 for Jackie which met with considerable difficulty until I
2 finally broke that door down -- the refusal of the U.S.
3 government to provide protection for her for quite a while.

4 Mr. Smeeton. Subsequent to her return?

5 Mr. Holsinger. Yes. They didn't think there was any
6 federal participation possible. They now believe there is.
7 And this is all lower-level stuff. But when I came in last
8 night from San Francisco, Autumn told me she had Jackie talk
9 to a reporter from the New York Times. She talked to Jackie
10 about it. Jackie made the phone call herself because Jackie
11 was very upset. It was Jackie's idea. Jackie was very
12 upset about some of the reports she had been hearing on the
13 radio and TV and seeing in the newspapers. And she felt,
14 at the time -- I might as well say for the record that she,
15 Jackie Speier, Autumn Ryan and myself all felt there was a
16 possibility that the State Department spokespersons were
17 trying to distort the record to Leo's discredit, for their
18 own protection, to tone the incident down, to confuse the
19 public. But we felt there was a possibility of a concerted
20 effort to do that. And this is why Jackie spoke up.

21 You will be seeing a statement from Autumn Ryan within
22 the next few days in the form of a Letter to the Editor,
23 her statement on the whole affair, including the cults. And
24 I want you to know that is going to be coming. When you
25 see it, you will understand, I hope, the anger and frustration

1 of the family as to what had occurred.

2 Mr. Berdes. Joe, we and the committee are very grateful
3 to you for your time and effort. I think you know that we are
4 going to probe this whole thing out at the Chairman's direction.
5 We will probably be coming back to you in due time for
6 additional information, some clarification perhaps.

7 Mr. Holsinger. All right. I appreciate this. I want the
8 record to be not only clear but accurate. It would be a
9 terrible disaster if the allegations I have transmitted, or
0 perhaps misjudgements I make, may hurt any innocent people.
1 I want to be very careful about that. But at the same time
2 I think it is obvious that the Ryan family, myself and Jackie
3 are all determined that the truth be known and that at least
4 if not all the truth, at least what can be shown is shown.
5 We think this is not just for Leo's memory, but he was so
6 dedicated to this country and what he was doing for the people
7 of this country -- that we feel the same way about it,
8 about what is good for this country, and it is for the people
9 of this country that we are doing this.

10 Mr. Berdes. Okay. Thank you very much.

11 (Whereupon at 5:15 p.m. the interview was concluded.)
12
13
14
15

COMMITTEES:
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
POST OFFICE AND
CIVIL SERVICE
OPERATIONS AND SERVICES
ISSUES AND POPULATION

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
December 8, 1978

LEO J. RYAN, M.C.
11TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

PLEASE REPLY TO:
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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

TO: Mr. George Berdes
Committee on International Relations
FROM: Joe Holsinger
Administrative Assistant
11th Congressional District, California
SUBJECT: Richard McCoy, Department of State

During the period prior to the departure of the Congressional Delegation to Guyana led by Leo Ryan, I attempted to get assistance and information from Richard McCoy on such matters as aircraft and ground transportation in Guyana, hotel facilities and visa requirements for media representatives.

I was told that Mr. McCoy was on military reserve duty and was not available until his return to the State Department after the Ryan delegation departure date. I was informed that his superior, a Mr. John Blacken, was filling in for him, but that Mr. Blacken was not familiar with the situation in Guyana.

Following the tragedy in Guyana, I discovered that Mr. McCoy was "on reserve duty" at the Defense Department, and also that Mr. Blacken had been Deputy Chief of Mission in Guyana.



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DISTRICT OFFICE AND
CIVIL SERVICE
OPERATIONS AND SERVICES
RACIAL MATTERS AND POPULATION

LEO J. RYAN, M.C.
11TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Mr. Mark
Director of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

Mr. Edwin Harris
Telephone 415-841-1773 or 415-841-8270

Dear Mr. Mark:

Attached herewith is a list of names telecopied to this office from Mr. Harris on December 7, 1978. Mr. Harris informed me by telephone that this is the list of the 200 most dangerous members of the People's Temple and indicated that these are the most likely to be members of any assassination groups.

Mr. Harris said that this list was compiled in Georgetown following the tragedy in Jonestown and was a result of the conversations and the exchange of information by both reformed and current members of the People's Temple who were detained as a group in Georgetown by the authorities.

Sincerely yours,

G.W. Joe Holsinger
Administrative Assistant
11th Congressional District

GWH:sjw

Enclosure

George Berder:
for your info.
Joe H

4/11/74 71924 (1)

Guyana

- Maileu Bogue ✓
- Vicky Marsh
- Gerald Johnson
- Stanley Wright
- Keth Wright
- Scott Thomas
- Ava Jones
- Stanley Jones
- Bruce Turner
- Shirley Hills
- Martha Hills
- Giff Carey
- Michael Simon
- Anthony Simon
- Jerome Simon
- Russell Horton
- Tim Sumner
- Stanley Gieg
- Clifford Gieg
- Dae Dae Maccom

High leadership -

Jim & Marcie Jones

LIST of people who were at CID 11/70

- Edith Bogue
- Harold Bondell
- Tracy Parks
- Jerry Parks
- Edith Parks
- Sandra Evans
- Diane Lewis
- Julius Evans
- Sonia Evans
- Cheryl Evans
- Cheryl Evans
- Leslie Wilson
- Jakari Wilson
- Richard Clark
- Jimmy Franklin
- Robert Paul

at Kaituma

James Bogue (Jones)
Dale Parks (Franklin)

Lost in woods

- Tina Bogue 23
- Tom Bogue 17
- Brenda Parks 18
- Tracy Parks 12
- Chris O'Neil 20

~~Hummer front center~~
8481773

115 ST Dangerous (Mostly of Security) (2)

Larry Layton
Jim McElvane
Carolyn Layton
Maruakatsaris
Annie Moore
Karen Layton

Mike Prokis
Tim Carter
Steve Jones
Tim Jones
Lew Jones
Terri Jones
Jimmy Jones Jr
Joe Wilson
~~Paul Adams~~

~~Frank~~
Frankie Sr.

Doug Sanders
Larry Jones
Ron Talley
Bob Kice
Kennis Kice
Larry Schatt
Gene Chalker (possible)
Harriet (Sarah) Tropp
Dick Tropp
Don Jackson
Joyce Touchette
Albert Touchette
Mike Touchette

Calvin Douglas
Al Smith
~~Frank~~ Karl Burnett
Eddie Crenshaw
Tom Grubbs
Ken ~~Horton~~ Norton
Bob Rankin
Marie Rankin
Deans Kutulas
Guy Mitchell
Lee Norton (Orsot)
Patty Cartmill

(Army)

Johnny Brown Jones
Bruce Oliver
Billy Oliver

(Army)

Pancho Johnson
Terita Fair (Jones)
Ronda Fortson
Rose Skilton
Maylou Clancy
Lita Tupper
Jack Brown
Teddy McHenry
Sebastian McHenry
OHS Mitchell (Harrison)
Danny Marshall
Chris Cordell
Carcliff Neal
Tom Jones (rite)
Joyce Touchette
Don Sly
Davis Glomery

Don Johnson
Joyce Touchette
~~Robert Touchette~~
~~Walter Touchette~~
Chuck Beckman
Lawyer Looman
Oscar Davis
John Cobb
~~Lee Tucker~~

~~Wesley~~
Tom Jones (wife)
~~Joyce Touchette~~
~~Don Sly~~
Oscar Looman
Chuck Kerkendall
Chris Hojaka
Owen Morgan
Al Somers
Cleofand Garcia
Bonnie Simon

S.G.

1955 Directory

(5)

Jean Brown
 Leon Collier
 Bonnie Beck
 Don Beck ?
 Sandy Bradshaw
 Andy's Lewis
 Jim Kendall
 Tim Dancy ?
 Betty Chester
 Cleveland Jackson?
 Lulu Jones
 Betty McCann
 Clark Jones
 Chris Johnson
 Florida Johnson
 Joe Hollis
 Rob Tamm
 James Clark
 Violet Jones
 Tom Adams
 Hugh Fortson
 Jimmy ~~James~~ Ingham
 Ernie Perkins
 Myrna Betts
 Judy Flowers
 James Evans
 Debbie Evans
 David Galley Galley

Archie James
 Rose James
 Norman James
 Ken Livingston (Wich)

Caracas Hospital
 Ray Goldstark (in ill)
 Joyce Parks
 Alaska Freighter
 Trinidad
 Charlie Touchette
 Helen Swinney
 Richard Gentry
 Phillip Blakey

~~Myrtle Johnson~~
Debbie Evans
David Galley
Frances Johnson
Dorise Surrency
Pat Huston
Quail Canyon
Margie Davis

Observations - Conclusions

Congress of the United States
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

Holsinger

personnel -- Accusation of leaks from State
A to P T. (p. 13) in Guyana Emb.

-- Ryan tried official channels
from early '77 to mid '78 at
which point he began to think
of doing work himself. (p. 19)

-- ~~State~~ Accusation State relied
too exclusively on McCoy's reports (19)

-- Accusation that State tried to
discourage Ryan from going (40)
① didn't want him to "make waves" w/ Guyana
② State theme: matter betw. private citizens

-- No indic. to Ryan from State of
potential danger (41-43)

(2)

Congress of the United States
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

- apparent diff. betw. Garry & Lane as to Lane's role w/ PT? (p. 49) (p. 92-93)
- diff as to conditions set down by Lane re R. visit (51)
- Ryan opinion "negative" re State handling (p. 51-52)
- R. attempts to "break through" US Amb. in Hanoi? (p. 53)
- R. apprehension of danger dismissed by him (54-55)
- Possibility R. thought of asking for Hanoi mil. protection but precluded by GOG view that this was private Amer. matter (p. 56)

3

Congress of the United States
Committee on International Relations
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- Accusation of attempt by Guyane Amb. Law. Mann to block newsmen from going (70)(p.81)
- Paranoid mentality developing in Holminger (p. 70)
- Media/Ryan joint protection mentality (p. 73)
- Accusations re. connection betw. Forber Burnham govt & Jones/PT (p. 81-
- Accusation re Lane/Harry & role of Don Sly (~~p. 93~~) (p. 97-99)